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Abstract
This article explores a startling and previously unnoticed line of cases 
in which state courts in the Jim Crow era ruled against white plaintiffs trying to 
use common law nuisance doctrine to achieve residential segregation.  These 
“race-nuisance” cases complicate the view of most legal scholarship that state 
courts during the Jim Crow era openly eschewed the rule of law in service of 
white supremacy.  Instead, the cases provide rich social historical detail 
showing southern judges wrestling with their competing allegiance to precedent 
and the white plaintiffs’ pursuit of racial exclusivity.  Surprisingly to many in 
the academy, the allegiance to precedent generally prevailed.
The cases confound prevailing legal theories, particularly new 
formalism and critical race theory’s interest convergence.  While new 
formalists may at first see these cases as supportive of their claims, the Article 
illustrates the limitations of formalism’s reach by also exploring the related line 
of racially restrictive covenant cases.  Similarly, while interest convergence 
scholars might attempt to read many of the cases as supporting white property 
owners’ interests, this Article demonstrates that the race-nuisance cases are 
better understood as demonstrating that white interests are multi-faceted.  
Interest convergence is therefore a useful way to explain unexpected outcomes 
but not to predict such outcomes.  In sum, the article casts substantial doubt on 
the background assumptions about the way law worked during the Jim Crow 
era, and thus provides a more textured understanding of that period.
The article also derives important insights into the present from the 
race-nuisance and related cases.  These insights offer both optimism for those 
concerned about racial liberation, but also realism about the limits of the law.  
First, common law doctrine may be a potentially powerful vehicle for people of 
color and other disenfranchised groups since courts in the United States do not 
lightly disassociate themselves from common law precedent or operative legal 
norms and ideals.  Second, the fact that white interests are not as monolithic as 
often presumed offers potential for strategic alliances that may significantly 
influence opportunities for success – both legal and political.  Lastly, and less 
hopefully, legal norms do not easily and always translate into social practice.  
Any hope for lasting change will be accomplished only by social and political 
movements.
1RACE NUISANCE :  THE POLITICS OF LAW 
IN THE JIM CROW ERA 
Rachel D. Godsil  
Table of Contents
I. Introduction..................................................................................... 2
II. Race and Nuisance in the Courts .............................................. 9
A. Overview of Nuisance Doctrine.................................................. 10
B. The Mere Presence of a Black Family is Not a Nuisance .......... 11
C. Mixed Results in Conduct Cases................................................. 16
1. Churches ................................................................................. 16
2. Funeral Homes and Cemeteries .............................................. 19
3. Hospitals, Sanatoriums, and Orphanages ............................... 22
4. Places of Amusement ............................................................. 24
III. Theories and Counter-theories................................................ 26
A. State Courts Furthering White Supremecy ................................. 27
B. Reflexive Formalism in Operation?............................................ 30
C. A Race Neutrality Ideal at Work?............................................... 34
D . Formalism and Equal Treatment Reconsidered – Racial Zoning 
and Restrictive Covenants .............................................................. 36
1. Racial Zoning.......................................................................... 37
2. Racially Restrictive Covenants............................................... 40
E. Interest Convergence:  Race Nuisance and Segregation ........... 42
1. Protecting the Rights of White Property Owners ................... 45
IV. Race Nuisance and Racial Liberation -- Insights into the 
Present ........................................................................................... 48
VI.  Conclusion...................................................................................... 52
2RACE NUISANCE :  THE POLITICS OF LAW
IN THE JIM CROW ERA
Rachel D. Godsil*
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1883, a white family brought a law suit in state court claiming 
that a black family moving in next door would be a nuisance.  The case, 
Falloon v. Schilling, was litigated to the Kansas Supreme Supreme 
Court, which issued a unanimous decision.2  This decision formed the 
precedent for 28 more such cases brought during the Jim Crow era in 
other state courts.  Most cases were in the south, Louisianna, Mississippi, 
Texas, Tennessee, but a few families brought what I call “race-nuisance” 
cases in the north as well.  When I recount this story to my students, 
other law professors, and even non-lawyers, the vast majority assume 
that I am describing yet another instance of racist state courts warping 
doctrine in favor of white supremecy.  The story’s conclusion suprises 
my listeners:  in most cases, the white plaintiffs lost.3
Many current scholars presume that “Jim Crow” 4  courts 
eschewed the rule of law, openly treating Black people as unworthy of 
legal protection.5 Articles addressing Jim Crow describe countless 
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Series, and the 2005 Property, Citizenship and Social Entrepreneurism, and the Seton 
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thank Kathleen Boozang, Carl Coleman, Richard Delgado, Jim Freeman, Tristin Green, 
Don Herzog, Solangel Maldonado, Denise Morgan, Kwesi Prempeh, and Charlie 
Sullivan for their critical suggestions on various drafts, as well as Marisol Cordero, Ed 
Kowalis, Amanda Kelly and Derek Nececkas for their truly superb research assistance.  
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 29 Kan. 292 (1883).
3 Few legal scholars have referenced the existence of white challenges to black people 
using common law nuisance and no one has yet analyzed the decisions.  See Carol 
Rose, The Story of Shelley v. Kraemer in PROPERTY STORIES 173 (Gerald Korngold and 
Andrew P. Morriss eds.) (2004); John Copeland Nagle, Moral Nuisances, 50 EMORY 
L.J. 265, 319 (2001).
4
 The term “Jim Crow” was originally popularized in the 1830s by a white minstrel, 
Thomas “Daddy” Rice.  Donning “black face” and attired in beggar’s clothes, Rice 
performed a routine he called “Jump Jim Crow,” in which he imitated an elderly and 
crippled Black man owned by a Mr. Crow:  “Weel about, and turn about / And do jis 
so; /Eb’ry time I weel about,/ I jump Jim Crow.”  Historians have not determined how 
Jim Crow came be synonomous with racial segregation.  LEON LITWACK, TROUBLE IN 
MIND: BLACK SOUTHERNERS IN THE AGE OF JIM CROW (1998).
5 See e.g., MARY FRANCES BERRY, THE PIG FARMER’S DAUGHER AND OTHER TALES 
OF AMERICAN JUSTICE:  EPISODES OF RACISM AND SEXISM IN THE COURTS FROM 1865 
3incidents of state courts’ differential treatment of Blacks, and many court 
opinions contain blatantly racist language.6 Needless to say, the Jim 
Crow era was replete with such behavior.  However, the race nuisance 
cases complicate this view.  Instead of the picture we expect, the cases
show southern judges wrestling with their competing allegiance to 
precedent and the white plaintiffs’ pursuit of racial exclusivity.
In these cases at least, the judges did not reflexively and 
consistently rule against Black people and for white plaintiffs in all 
cases.  In light of the underlying racism of this era, this article explores
multiple legal theories in search of an explanation:  legal formalism,7
property theory,8 and critical race theory.9 Each sheds light on aspects of 
judicial decisionmaking in these cases – but ultimately, none 
satisfactorily explains  the entire picture.  
My goal in this Article is, to use Randall Kennedy’s words, to 
“confront the full, complicated vastness”10 of this particular history, 
rather then viewing it as an alien caricature supporting a particular 
scholarly view. The value of these cases lies in their details and 
specificity.  The details allow us then to critique and complicate the one-
size-fits all theories so common in legal scholarship.11
When we look closely, we observe some southern state courts 
yielding to precedent, relying upon stated norms of equal treatment and 
race neutrality, and reaching outcomes obverse to white plaintiffs.  A 
TO THE PRESENT 91 (2000); A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Racism in American and South 
African Courts:  Similarities and Differences, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 479, 521 (1990); cf.
KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 81 (Oxford Univ. Press 2004) [hereinafter
KLARMAN, JIM CROW].
6 See infra notes --.
7
 Others will contend from a different political perspective that the cases illustrate the 
potency of what David Bernstein calls “traditional jurisprudence” or legal formalism.  
See DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, ONLY ONE PLACE OF REDRESS: AFRICAN AMERICANS, 
LABOR REGULATIONS, AND THE  COURTS FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE NEW DEAL
(2001).  The Jim Crow judges were reflexive formalists for whom race was not always 
as salient as is often assumed.  
8
 Scholars including most recently Michael Klarman have argued that concern for 
private property rights transcends even its concomminant racism:  in other words, 
property trumps.  See MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS 81 
(2004).9
 A critical race theorist would likely read the cases as an example of Derrick Bell’s 
white interest convergence.  According to this view, the cases likely reaffirm broader 
white interests.  Obviously, the fact that white plaintiffs lost does not necessarily 
guarantee that the interests of white elites were not furthered by the cases. See Derrick 
A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. 
L. REV. 518 (1980).
10
   Randall Kennedy, Race Relations and the Tradition of Celebration:  The Case of 
Professor Schmidt, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1622 n.36 (1986).
11 Legal historians often critique what they refer to as “law-office history” – which is 
the practice of using historical facts selectively to support a predetermined normative 
position.  See Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. 
REV. 119, 122 n.13. 
4“new formalist” might use these cases as evidence of both the normative 
value and the prevalence of formalist decisionmaking.  I argue, however, 
that the race nuisance cases cannot be fully explained by formalist 
decisionmaking and, more significantly, that the related line of cases 
concerning racial zoning and the enforceability of racially restrictive 
covenants show the limits to formalism in some racially charged cases.
State courts were split on the constitutionality of racial zoning cases and 
all southern courts and most northern courts with significant Black 
populations enforced restrictive covenants, while some western and 
northern courts did not.12
In other words, during the same period that courts were adhering 
to nuisance precedent to rule against whites seeking to exclude 
individual Black families or institutions from locating in their neighbor-
hoods, courts were also twisting precedent to uphold the enforceability 
of racially restrictive covenants.  The challenge for formalism is then to 
explain the difference between the two sets of cases.
Some scholars have suggested that our national commitment to 
property rights dictated the outcome of property disputes even when race 
was involved.  This use of property explains divergent decisions in the 
property area without upsetting our general assumption that white 
inter ests always prevail.  The problem with this argument is that in most 
property disputes, both parties will have a property interest at stake.  In 
the nuisance context, the plaintiff is seeking to protect her interest in her 
enjoyment of her land, while the defendant is defending his use of his 
land.  Both are “sticks” in the property “bundle.”  Similarly, in racially 
restrictive covenant cases, the plaintiff will be a property owner with an 
interest in enforcing a covenant which presumably bolsters her property 
value, while the defendant will be a current or prospective property 
owner seeking the right to alienate or purchase property.  Both are 
property interests which courts have in other contexts gone far to protect.  
Therefore, the simple assertion that property trumps often made by 
scholars trying to explain decisions involving race and property that 
don’t favor the white party fails to tell us anything helpful.  
While a simplistic recitation of the importance of property does 
not explain much, property theory from this period is more enlightening.
Recent scholarship reasserting a natural-law theory of property suggests 
that in the pre-20th century legal regime, a physical-invasion theory of 
property created a strong presumption in favor of free use of land unless 
one’s use resulted in a physical invasion of another’s property.13  This 
argument helps establish a theoretical baseline for the race-nuisance 
cases.  This theory, however, does not explain why race did not become 
one of the many exceptions to this general trend.  Courts created 
12 Id.
13 See Eric Claeyes, Jefferson Meets Coase: Train Sparks, Natural Rights, and Law 
and Economics (draft on file with author).
5exceptions for funeral homes, “bawdy” houses, and certain other uses 
that did not cause a physical invasion of another’s land, but upset certain 
norms of order and morality.  It was certainly conceivable that race 
might have become one of those exceptions. 
Instead, there appears to have been some commitment to the 
norm of race neutrality or equal treatment – even in state courts during 
Jim Crow.   In response to the “Black Codes” that proliferated in the 
post-Civil War South, the Reconstruction Congress enacted the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866, which provided to all persons regardless of race “the 
same right, in every State and Territory in the United States, to make and 
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, 
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to 
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of 
person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens.”14
The first race-nuisance decision seems to have tracked the Civil 
Rights Act and the ideals underlying its passage.  The Court stated:
Equity will not interfere simply because the occupants of such 
house are by reason of race, color, or habits disagreeable or 
offensive.  A negro family is not, per se, a nuisance; and a white 
family cannot prevent his neighbor from renting his home to a 
negro family any more than he can to a German, an Irish or a 
French family.15
No court held to the contrary.
A critical race theorist may reply that courts were always seeking 
to maximize white interests even when the stated outcome of the case 
appeared to favor people of color.  One variant of this claim is Derrick 
Bell’s well-known theory of interest convergence.16  This story plays out 
in the race-nuisance cases because a reasonable number of the race 
nuisance cases may have actually buttressed segregation by facilitating 
the existence of separate institutions for Blacks.  Very few of the race-
nuisance cases challenged the architecture of segregation.  Rather, most 
of the cases were brought by white landowners seeking to exclude 
segregated institutions17 or white families seeking to house Black 
14 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
15 Falloon, 29 Kan. at 292.
16
 Bell, supra note __.
17 Thoenebe v. Mosby, 101 A. 98 (1917); Green v. State ex rel. Chatham, 56 So.2d 12 
(1952).; Morrison v. Rawlinson, 7 S.E.2d 635 (1940); Fox v. Corbitt, 194 S.W. 88 
(1917); Giles v. Rawlings, 97 S.E. 521 (1918); Harty v. Guerra, 269 S.W. 1064 (1925); 
Mitchell v. Deisch, 18 S.W.2d 364 (1929); City Council of City and County of Denver 
v. United Negroes Protective Ass’n, 76 Colo. 86 (1924); Hall v. Moffett, 170 S.E. 193 
(1933); Diggs v. Morgan College, 105 A. 157 (1918); Killian v. British Shalom 
Congregation, 154 S.W.2d 387 (1941); Dudley v. City of Charlotte, 27 S.E.2d 732 
(1943); Crist v. Henshaw, 163 P.2d 214 (1945); Baptist Church of Madisonville v. 
Webb, 178 S.W. 689 (1915); Boyd v. Bd. of Councilmen of City of Frankfort, 77 
S.W.669 (1903); Spencer Chapel M.E. Church v. Brogan, 231 P. 1074 (1924); 
6servants on their property.18  Only a few of the cases were brought by 
whites trying to exclude individual Blacks of equal status from white 
neighborhoods.19  For a segregated society to exist, segregated 
institutions had to be located somewhere, and the small Black enclaves 
may not have been big enough for cemeteries, hospitals, parks and 
sanatoriums.  Therefore, the cases in which white plaintiffs were 
unsuccessful may simply have been instances in which the interests of a 
small number of white landowners were sacrificed for the greater good 
of racial segregation.  
However, this theory does not explain all the cases.  Several of 
the cases simply cannot be ascribed to the fulfillment of white 
supremacy – a Black funeral director permitted to move into a wealthy 
white Memphis neighborhood, a Black man dispensing medicine without 
a license to whites and Blacks alike.20  If contrary outcomes to any 
dispute can be decided as interest convergence, then it is such a broad 
claim that it fails to explain any outcome.  Moreover, it eliminates any 
agency on the part of the Black litigants.
A close read of these cases also complicates the interest 
convergence theory by showing the impossibility of identifying a 
universal “white” interest.  Instead, the nuisance and related cases 
illustrate that white interests are not monolithic.  At regular intervals, a 
particular outcome would help one group of whites and harm another.  
For example, cases involve white people challenging other white 
peoples’ attempts to house Black servants on their property.21  We can 
say that obviously the dominant class is the group able to hire servants 
rather than the group opposing their residence.  However, others are not 
so easily categorized.  Is the dominant class the developer seeking the 
right to sell to whoever would purchase, or the developer seeking to 
maintain a particular area’s racial exclusivity?  Indeed, the cases show 
that groups of whites sometimes collaborated with groups of people of 
color to seek jointly beneficial goals.  The conventional view of white 
peoples’ motives and behavior during the Jim Crow era would suggest 
the impossibility of these moves.  
Lancaster v. Harwood, 245 S.W. 755; Wright v. DeFatta, 142 So.2d 489 (1962); City of 
Memphis v. Qualls, 64 S.W.2d 548 (1933); Jones v. Trawick, 75 So.2d 785 (1954); 
Woods v. Kiersky, 14 S.W.2d 825 (1929).
18 Lancaster, 245 S.W. 755; Woods, 14 S.W.2d 825; Young v. St. Martin’s Church, 64 
A.2d 814 (1949).
19 Falloon, 29 Kan. 292; Holbrook v. Morrison, 100 N.E. 1111 (1913).
20
   These cases undercut any dichotomous distinction between idealism and realism –
neither theory can wholly explain our actions.  See DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES 11-14
(1989).  Viewing the three sets of cases in detail suggest that ideals sometimes affect 
out comes in ways that seem to diverge from interests, but that these same ideals are 
often overwhelmed by the pursuit of contrasting interests.  Even in the latter scenario, 
though, the ideals may set the stage for later progress.  
21 Lancaster, 245 S.W. 755; Worm v. Wood, 223 S.W. 1016 (1920).
7While the race-nuisance cases are filled with racist references, 
they nonetheless show that as an “ideal,” race neutrality was in play 
during this era.  As an operative ideal, it may help to explain the 
difference in the outcomes and ideals present in the nuisance, zoning and 
restrictive covenant cases.   For race to affect the outcome in the 
nuisance cases, courts would have had to find expressly that race was 
salient to the outcome.  The white plaintiffs were asking courts to make 
an affirmative finding that black people as a class were nuisances – akin 
to pollution.  If courts considered the legal ideals of equal treatment to 
have any meaning at all, they precluded such a finding.  By contrast, the 
racial zoning cases involved courts either invalidating or deferring to leg-
islative decisions about the separation of the races, and the restrictive 
covenant cases allowed the judges to see themselves as simply enforcing 
private agreements.  A court decision labeling Blacks a nuisance would 
have been a much more significant deviation from the legal ideal of 
equal treatment than a court decision upholding a private covenenant ex-
cluding Blacks. 22  The racial zoning cases were more troublesome 
because they clearly involved state action – but after Plessy v. 
Ferguson,23 simply separating the races had of course been upheld.  
Indeed, in the cases upholding racial zoning, the courts often mentioned 
the beneficial effects of segregation.  
From this rich historical source, we can also derive insight into 
the present.  Some of these insights offer hope for the role of law in 
securing racial liberation.  From these opinions, we can conclude that 
courts in the United States do not lightly disassociate themselves from 
common law precedent or operative legal norms and ideals.  Therefore, 
legal doctrine and ideals are worth fighting over.  The race-nuisance, and 
related cases, also shed light on the role of strategic alliances in legal 
battles.  First, there have always been some in the dominant group who 
hold a firm ideological commitment to equality.  Perhaps more 
importantly, the interests of the dominant classes are not monolithic –
subsets of whites will at different points have more in common with 
people of color than with other groups of whites.  These instances should 
be exploited through the formation of strategic alliances.   These 
strategic alliances are age-old – the litigants in Buchanan v. Warley used 
them,24 as did those favoring affirmative action in the recent Grutter liti-
gation.25
22
   According to formalist or classical legal scholars, most legal disputes “had ‘right’ 
answers dictated by a small number of relatively abstract principles.’”  Stephen A. 
Siegel, John Chipman Gray and the Moral Basis of Classical Legal Thought, 86 IOWA 
L. REV. 1513, 1521.  If that were so, one would assume that courts with differing 
political views about race and integration would reach the same outcome when deciding 
whether the covenants were valid.  See infra Part III.C. for a full discussion of the 
racially restrictive covenant cases.  
23
  163 U.S. 537 (1896).
24 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).  
25 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
8However, the fact that cases such as these were decided during 
the Jim Crow era should also caution us about the limits of the law.  It is 
intriguing to anyone interested in the historical development of law that 
some judges in the Jim Crow era subscribed – or felt obligated to invoke 
– ideals of equal treatment.  It is also obvious that this norm did not 
translate into social practice.  Indeed, the litigants in the cases 
themselves may not even have benefited from the legal ideals.  There are 
limits to relying solely upon legal opinions to deduce any conclusions 
about life as it was lived.  The white plaintiffs who sought to use 
nuisance law to exclude Blacks from their neighborhoods may have 
turned to other means to achieve this end once they lost in court.  As 
Carol Rose has argued:
[O]ur everday lives are filled with instances that call on us to 
respect property, even when no policemen or private retaliation 
can restrain us:  we don’t steal the unlocked and unguarded 
bicycle, we don’t pocket the bubble gum when no one is looking, 
we live up to our side of a deal, even with a stranger who would 
have no easy way to enforce the bargain.  A property regime, in 
short, depends upon a web of respect, honor, and acceptance that 
somehow modifies the immediate appetite for ‘more.’26
Regardless of the outcomes of certain cases, this crucial web of 
respect, honor and acceptance of the rights of Blacks to own property 
was lacking.  Indeed, land ownership often incited violent reprisal by 
whites.27   A Savannah Black newspaper reported, “It is getting to be a 
dangerous thing, to acquire property, to get an education, to own an 
automobile, to dress well, and to build a respectable home.”28  Another 
Black newspaper reported, “[n]ot infrequently, successful blacks found 
themselves accused of improper relations with a white woman and were 
forced to sell their property at a loss and leave town.”29   During a public 
debate between two young Black women in Charlotte in 1901 entitled, 
“Is the South the Best Home for the Negro?”, Laura Arnold noted:  “All 
too many blacks . . .had placed their fondest hopes  in the security of 
property, only to be devastated without notice or reason.”30
The cases do not present a rosy picture of life or law in the Jim 
Crow era.  They are replete with the racism of the day.  Nor do they 
undercut the reality of lynchings, violence, and disenfranchisement that 
took place during this period.  Instead, they illustrate that these social 
practices occurred despite a legal system that had somewhat more in 
26
   Carol Rose, ‘Enough and As Good’ of What?, 81 N.W.U.L.R. 417, 438 (1987).
27
  Despite formidable obstacles, by 1910, Blacks acquired fifteen million acres of land 
in southern states. See Thomas W. Mitchell, From Reconstruction to Deconstruction:  
Undermining Black Landownership, Political Independence, and Community Through 
Partition Sales of Tenancies in Common, 95 NORTHWESTERN L. REV. 505, 526 (2001).
28 Id. at 153.
29 Id.
30 Id.
9common with our own than we like to remember.  As importantly, the 
cases introduce us to people who challenged the white supremacist status 
quo during its ascendance – and prevailed.  
This article begins with a detailed description of the race-
nuisance cases.  I divide the cases into the “mere presence”31 cases, in 
which white landowners argued that the presence of certain racial 
minorities interfered with their use and enjoyment of land, and the 
“conduct” cases, in which whites contended that the particular uses of 
land by these same groups resulted in common law nuisances.  Part II 
examines   competing jurisprudential theories formalism, property 
theory, and critical race theory, and the related linen of cases involving 
racial zoning and racially restrictive covenants.  This Part concludes that 
each is useful in understanding the outcomes of the race-nuisance cases, 
but none sufficient.  Part III offers a series of insights into the present 
from the race-nuisance and related cases.  
II. RACE AND NUISANCE IN THE COURTS  
Conventional wisdom would predict during the worst of the Jim 
Crow era, white plaintiffs would have been able to use nuisance doctrine 
successfully to challenge the presence of Black people in white 
neighborhoods. Nuisance doctrine during this era was an elastic concept 
that formally at least precluded any use of land that would cause 
annoyance to adjacent landowners.32  The presence of Black people 
would undoubtedly have caused such annoyance to the many racist and 
segregationist whites of this era.   The first two decades of the 20th
century saw  waves of pseudo science supporting notions of Black 
inferiority that cemented racist attitudes and supported the need to 
segregate the races.33  According to historian George Fredrickson, whites 
began to conclude that there was a need to “segregate or quarantine a 
race liable to be a source of contamination and social danger to the white 
community, as it sank even deeper into the slough of disease, vice and 
31
   Nagle, supra note __, at 275 (noting that some neighbors complained of the “mere 
presence” of an unmarried couple and African-American family).
32 See, e.g., Carol Rose, A Dozen Propositions on Private Property, Public Rights, and 
the New Takings Legislation, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 265, 273 (Rose notes that “late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century American states increasingly recognized rights 
of action for nuisance against landowners who caused undue smoke, fumes, noise, 
water pollution, and even loss of light and air”, but also cites cases involving the 
breeding of mares and stallions within the sight and hearing of a dwelling).
33 See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Social Science and Segregation Before Brown, 1985 
DUKE L.J. 624, 651-56 (1985) (Hovenkamp explores the science and social science 
racial inferiority theories of the late 19th and early 20th century and concludes that the 
science of the day created a great fear of the social costs of racial mixing, prompting 
segregation legislation); Schmitt, supra note __ at 453.   
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criminality.”34  The white plaintiffs in the race nuisance cases sought to 
enshrine these views into law in the race nuisance cases.  
This Part surveys the race nuisance cases in detail.  I have 
identified 28 reported appellate decisions in which white homeowners or 
municipal governments sought to use nuisance doctrine to preclude the 
use of land by Blacks or other racial minorities.  The first section 
describes those cases in which white homeowners claimed that the “mere 
presence” of racial minorities constituted a nuisance.  These cases were 
uniformly unsuccessful.  The second section describes cases in which 
white homeowners or municipal governments challenged certain conduct 
occurring on the land by Blacks or other racial minorities.  The results 
are significantly more mixed in these cases.  Because few readers are 
likely to be familiar with the cases, this Part is intended to be descriptive 
and not analytical.35  I explain my conclusions and impressions from the 
cases in Parts IV and V.
A. Overview of Nuisance Doctrine
Nuisance law was in the midst of tremendous change from the 
late 19th to the mid-20th century.  The doctrine originally protected each 
landowner’s right to the quiet enjoyment of his land.36 Courts thus 
enjoined any use – even if otherwise legal – that infringed upon the 
essential elements of a landowner’s enjoyment.37   According to 
Blackstone’s Commentaries, “’it is incumbent on a neighboring owner to 
find some other place,’” if the neighbor’s use of his land “’causes injury 
to the land of another.’”38
As industrialization flourished, many courts became more 
restrictive with the concept of nuisance.39  A primary means to allow 
industrialization without formally altering the doctrine was to refuse to 
34 GEORGE FREDERICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND 255 (1971). 
35
 There are multiple ways to categorize the cases, chronologically in recognition that 
different historical periods may explain different outcomes, by state because different 
cultural contexts may explain different outcomes, and by type of conduct in recognition 
of jurisprudential differences.  I chose the latter for ease of comparison among cases 
and because this essay is attempting to understand modes of judicial decisionmaking.
36 MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 31 
(Harvard U. Press 1977).  As Louise Halper has written, nuisance has long been 
considered a “messy and dated doctrine.”  Louise Halper, Untangling the Nuisance 
Knot, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 89, 90 (1998). 
37 Rachel Godsil, Viewing the Cathedral from Behind the Color Line:  Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Environmental Racism, 53 EMORY L. J. 1807, 1851-1858 (2004).  
38
   3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 217-218; see also Louise A. Halper, Nuisance, 
Courts and Markets in the New York Court of Appeal 1850-1915, 54 ALBANY L. REV. 
301, 305 (1990); Jeff L. Lewin, Boomer and the American Law of Nuisance: Past, 
Pre sent, and Future, 54 ALB. L. REV. 189, 195 (1990).
39 Id. at 199.
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issue injunctive relief to enjoin prospective nuisances.40  Courts were in 
considerable disagreement over the degree of interference that should be 
legally tolerable and the relevance of social utility of defendants’ use.41
Some courts focused upon the plaintiff’s right to be free from 
unreasonable interference.  Others held that plaintiffs have an action only 
if defendant’s use of his land is itself unlawful.42  Ultimately, some 
courts began expressly to adopt a formulation of nuisance doctrine that 
balanced the interests of plaintiffs and defendants, focusing on such 
factors as the degree of harm, the locality, and the social value of 
defendant’s actions.43
However, with regard to purely residential uses, not disputes 
between residents and industry, courts have arguably become less 
restrictive over the decades.  Some courts never deviated from the more 
formalistic definition of nuisance as any action that resulted in a 
substantial harm to another’s use of land.44  Others, perhaps responding 
to the recognition of the importance of aesthetics in land use planning 
generally, have allowed aesthetic harms to form the basis for a nuisance 
action.45At bottom, nuisance doctrine was largely in flux during the era in 
which the race-nuisance cases were brought.  Indeed, John Nagle, the 
only recent scholar to grapple with the question of what sorts of harm are 
or should be cognizable as nuisances,46  both acknowledges the difficulty 
of identifying nuisance doctrine’s inherent limitations, and uses early 
20th century nuisance cases to define the contours of actionable harm.  
B. The Mere Presence of a Black Family is Not a Nuisance 
In 1883, the Kansas Supreme Court in a case entitled Falloon v. 
Schilling considered the question of first impression of whether nuisance 
doctrine entitled a white family to enjoin a neighboring landowner from 
renting homes to Black families.47   In bold and sweeping language 
authored by Justice David Brewer, the Court declared that it did not:
40
 See Andrew H. Sharp, Comment, An Ounce of Prevention:  Rehabilitating the 
Anticipatory Nuisance Doctrine, 15 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 627, 630 (1998).  Some 
courts limited anticipatory nuisance findings to “per se nuisances.”  See, e.g., Cooper v. 
Whissen, 130 S.W. 703, 704 (Ark. 1910); King v. Hamill, 54 A. 625, 627 (Md. 1903).  
Others denied injunctive relief by requiring specific and definite allegations of harm; 
see Adams v. Michael, 38 Md. 123, 128 (1873).  
41
   Lewin, supra note __, at 201-203.
42 Id. at 202.
43 Id. at 209.
44 See, e.g., Jost v. Dairyland Power Coop., 172 N.W.2d 647 (Wis. 1969).  
45 See, e.g. Prah v. Maretti, 108 2d 223 (1982).
46
   Nagle, supra note __, passim.
47
   29 Kan. 292.
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Equity will not interfere simply because the occupants of such 
house are by reason of race, color, or habits disagreeable or 
offensive.  A negro family is not, per se, a nuisance; and a white 
family cannot prevent his neighbor from renting his home to a 
negro family any more than he can to a German, an Irish or a 
French family.48
In Falloon, defendant Schilling owned an 80 acre tract in the rapidly 
growing town of Hiawatha.  He sold less than an acre of the land, which 
was ultimately purchased by plaintiff Falloon, a white man who lived on 
the property with his wife and young sons.  The Falloon family home 
was within 13 feet of the next lot.   Schilling wanted to buy back the 
land, but his offer was rejected.  In his complaint, Falloon claims that 
Schilling then “conceived the oppressive and unlawful idea of rendering 
[his] home obnoxious and unendurable by erecting cheap tenement 
houses on either side of [his] land and filling them with worthless 
negroes, that they may annoy [Falloon’s] wife, who is a person of 
delicate health”, and punish them for refusing Schilling’s offer.  
Consistent with his plan, Schilling erected a small building of 12 by 20 
feet, and placed it within four feet of Falloon’s land.  He then rented it to 
a “colored preacher, who occupied it with his wife and one child.”49
Falloon brought suit, seeking to enjoin Schilling from erecting 
such buildings, on the grounds that the size of the homes and the race of 
the occupants violated the maxim “sic utere tuo ut alienum non 
laedes.”50   The Court found that Falloon failed to sustain his allegations 
since the homes, while small, looked neat and that the family in fact was 
the family of a preacher and “behaved well” and were not “worthless
negroes.”51
In addition to the language noted above, with respect to the 
renting to ‘negroes,’ the Court stated: 
The law makes no distinction on account of race or color, and 
recognizes no prejudices arising therefrom.  As long as the 
neighbor’s family is well behaved, it matters not what the color, 
race, or habits may be, or how offensive personally or socially, it 
may be to plaintiff; plaintiff has no cause of complaint in the 
courts.52
48 Id. at 294.
49 Id. at 292.
50 Id. at 293.
51 Id. at 292 (italics in the original).  In addition, the court found that as a universal rule, 
the size and quality of a house never itself constitutes a nuisance.  “A land-owner may 
erect upon his land the smallest or most temporary kind of dwelling- house or store in 
close proximity to the finest mansion.” Id. at 293.
52 Id. at 294.
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Nuisance treatises and digests immediately incorporated the Falloon 
holding.53
Falloon and the treatise language it inspired appear to have 
influenced at least two of the five other reported cases that considered 
whether the mere presence or potential for the presence of Blacks or 
other people of color near a white residence constituted a nuisance.   In 
Worm v. Wood,54 and Lancaster v. Harwood,55 both decided by appellate 
courts in Texas in the early 1920s, the courts rejected plaintiffs’ requests 
for injunctions to enjoin Blacks and Mexicans from moving nearby, 
despite the claim that their presence “will greatly injure and practically 
destroy the social conditions of the neighborhoods.”56
The Worm court quoted a treatise in dismissing the argument that 
small shacks occupied by “negroes, and Mexicans and a low class of 
white people”57 would allegedly cause unhealthy conditions and a 
greater likelihood of fire.  While the court allowed that such uses may in 
the manner of their use constitute a nuisance, the court was firm that 
“character of use is not inherent in the houses of the character of those 
alleged in plaintiffs’ petition, and as the same will not necessarily follow, 
the building of the houses, which is lawful, cannot be enjoined.”58  In 
other words, small shacks housing Blacks, Mexicans, and poor whites 
are not necessarily nuisances.
Worm was then cited by the court in Lancaster v. Harwood.59   In 
contrast both to the egalitarian language employed by the court in 
Falloon and the terse conclusions reached in Worm, the Lancaster court 
chose to cite the plaintiffs’ allegations at some length and to describe the 
inner turmoil of the judges.
Agnes Harwood sought to enjoin John Lancaster from erecting a 
garage and servants’ quarters, which would house “negro” servants.  The 
white family described the harm they would experience from the 
presence of the ‘negro’ servants in detail.60  The Texas Supreme Court 
53 For example, an early authoritative treatise, the R.C.L. text stated: 
It is true as a general proposition that a proprietor enjoys a right to improve his 
own property in any way he sees fit, provided the improvement is not such a 
one as the law will pronounce a nuisance; and this he may do, although he 
make such improvement through malice or ill will.  And accordingly it has 
been held that the owner of land has the right to erect small, cheap and 
movable tenement houses thereon close to the line of an adjacent owner, and 
let them to orderly colored tenants.
20 R.C.L. s. 45, p. 429.
54
 223 S.W. 1016 (1920).
55
 245 S.W. 755 (1922).
56 Worm, 223 S.W. at 1018.
57 Id. at 1018.
58 Id. at 1019.
59
 245 S.W. at 757.
60 Id. at 755-756.
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dissolved the trial court’s temporary restraining order, but made clear 
that the judges personally sympathized with the appellee:  
We earnestly deprecate the inexorable mandate of the law 
forbidding us the privilege of following our own personal 
sentiments, which, as individuals, we are frank to admit, are 
wholly with the appellee, and which if we were at liberty to 
follow, would result in granting the appellee the relief sought.61
The Court noted the inefficiency of law:  
To prevent all acts of injustice from being inflicted, and that, 
where the law is powerless in its application to prevent such 
injuries, the observance of the "Golden Rule" can only be looked 
to as a panacea in that portion of our country where there exists a 
just and a well-defined impassable gulf between the white 
element of its population and the negro race. But, as the hand of 
our invisible Guide leads us, we must follow on to a conclusion, 
ascertaining and declaring the rights of litigants as justified and 
determined by the established rules of law.62
In 1929, in Woods v. Kiersky,63 a third Texas court dismissed 
without discussion an attempt by John W. Woods to enjoin his neighbor 
from building a garage that would house Blacks.  The court dismissed as 
“mere surplasage” Woods’ claim that his family would be disturbed by 
the use of the upper story of the garage by Black people.64
Neither Falloon nor the treatises were cited in the remaining 
three reported cases on this issue, Holbrook v. Morrison,65 in 
Massachusets in 1913, Diggs v. Morgan College,66 in Maryland in 1918, 
and Crist v. Henshaw,67 in Oklahoma in 1945.  Nonetheless, in each, the 
appellate courts denied the plaintiffs’ requests for injunctions, holding 
that the presence of a disliked racial group fails to constitute a nuisance.
Holbrook, reminiscent of Falloon, involved a suit by a white 
landowner seeking to enjoin another white landowner from placing a 
sign in front of her house stating “For Sale Best Offer from Colored 
Family.”68  The Massachusets Supreme Court equated the right to sell to 
a “colored family” with other land actions that are legal even if harmful 
to a neighbor’s property:  
There can be no doubt that the respondent has the right to 
advertise her property for sale by signs or in the usual way, and to 
sell it if she sees fit to a negro family, even though the effect may 
61 Id. at 756-757.
62 Id. at 757.
63
  14 S.W.2d 825.
64 Id. at 828.
65
  100 N.E. 1111 (1913).
66
  105 A. 157 (1918).
67
 163 P.2d 214 (1945),
68
  100 N.E at 1111.
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be to impair the business of the complainants; just as for instance, 
the owner of land on a hillside may cultivate it in the usual way 
even though the effect of the surface drainage may be to fill up 
his neighbors millpond below.69
The Maryland Supreme Court rejected a white homeonwer’s suit in
Diggs, 70 on constitutional grounds.  In that case, white homeowners 
sought to prevent a Black college from expanding its housing, and the 
court did not focus on nuisance law doctrine, but simply cited the 
Supreme Court’s decision striking down racial zoning, Buchanan v. 
Warley.71
After Diggs, there were no reported cases involving challenges to 
the mere presence of Blacks for a few decades.  In Crist v. Henshaw, 
decided by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in 1945, white homeowners 
argued that subdividing a tract of land to create a settlement of persons 
“exclusively of African descent” was a public nuisance because it would 
reduce and destroy the market value of their property and create 
“insufferable and unlivable conditions.”72  The plaintiffs also argued that 
the sale of property to negroes would destroy the school system and 
require plaintiffs to abandon their homes.73  As in Diggs, the Court 
decided on constitutional grounds, finding that such a holding would 
impair the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the 14th amendment.  The 
Court’s reasoning, that “it would be discrimination for a court to restrict 
such sales” was the precise reasoning used by the Supreme Court three 
years later in Shelley v. Kraemer.74
*  *   *
It appears that no appellate courts between the end of 
Reconstruction and the decision in Brown v. Board of Education found 
the mere presence of Blacks or Mexicans to be a nuisance.  These 
outcomes are surprisingly contrary to the assumptions most academics 
would bring to their consideration of property doctrine arising from this 
era and should be food for thought for property and race scholars alike.  
However, it is worth noting that two trial courts reached contrary 
69 Id.
70
  105 A. at 159.
71
 245 U.S. 60 (1917).  The Court stated: “Whatever may have been entertained 
formerly, since the decision in Buchanan v. Warely, and Jackson v. State, it is clear that 
the improvement of land as a colored residential neighborhood is not of itself a public 
nuisance.”  105 A. at 159.
72
  163 P.2d 214.
73 Id. at 215.
74
 334 U.S. 1 (1948). The Court went on to say without any direct citations that:  “The 
law is clear that the sale of land to negroes or the improvement of lands as a residential 
settlement is not itself a public nuisance.  If such was not the law it would be almost 
impossible for negroes to ever start a new settlement for the betterment of themselves 
or their race.  To hold otherwise would make the fourteenth amendment and the Civil 
Rights Act meaningless.”  163 P.2d at .216.
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conclusions.  In Holbrook and Lancaster, the appellate courts reversed
trial court decisions granting injunctions to the white homeowners.  
Because trial court decisions are typically unpublished, it is impossible 
to know with any certainty what number of other cases were brought and 
decided in favor of white homeowners and never appealed.   
C. Mixed Results in Conduct Cases
In the “mere presence” cases described in the previous section, 
the reported court decisions and treatises on the issue were uniform.  
This section describes cases involving claims that certain conduct 
engaged in by people of color constituted a nuisance.  White plaintiffs 
sought to paint Black churches, funeral homes, parks, homes for orphans 
and the aged, hospitals and tuberculosis sanatoriums, dance halls, 
crowded housing, and saloons as nuisances.  In a slight majority, 13 of 
23 cases, appellate courts rejected claims that these land uses by Blacks 
constituted a nuisance.  As with the presence cases, however, even those 
opinions favoring Black landowners often evinced racial bias and 
stereotypes.  
1. Churches  
Outside of the race-nuisance context, it was well-established that 
churches were not nuisances per se, but could in rare circumstances be 
considered nuisances in fact if their operation had an ill effect on 
neighboring residents’ enjoyment of their land.  
In three instances, white communities sought to enjoin the 
construction or operation of Black churches.  The Supreme Courts of 
both Kentucky (in 1903)75 and Oklahoma (in 1924) 76 declined to grant 
the white communities the relief they sought, but in South Carolina (in 
1940), 77 the Court found the way in which the prayer services were 
conducted to be a nuisance in fact.  In all three cases, white communities 
inveighed against the perceived exuberant style of Black worship, which 
they claimed affected their use and enjoyment of their property and 
decreased its property value.78  However, both Boyd v. Bd. of 
75 Boyd, 77 S.W.669.
76 Spencer Chapel, 231 P. 1074.
77 Morrison, 7 S.E.2d 635.
78
 In a related context, the St. Louis Court of Appeals reversed the conviction of a 
Black minister for breaching the peace with his shouts of “Amen,” “Praise God,” and 
“Glory Hallelujah” in a voice loud enough to be heard six blocks away.  City of 
Louisiana v. Bottoms, 300 S.W. 316 (1927) (“not to be officially published”).  The 
court stated that it could not bring itself to construe the breach of the peace statute to 
embrace religious fervor, noting that “there was once a time in this country when a 
minister, whose voice would not have carried for a greater distance than two city 
blocks, would certainly have been accepted with greatly restrained enthusiasm.”  Id. at 
318.   The court also stated that it could not imagine that the city fathers could have 
intended for the ordinance to prohibit the sounds of worship in either “a lowly negro 
17
Councilman of the City of Frankfort79 and Spencer Chapel Methodist 
Episcopal Church v. Brogan80 involved attempts to prohibit the 
construction of a new church facility, while Morrison v. Rawlinson81
involved a City Council attempt to declare the existing church a nuisance 
in fact.
In Spencer Chapel,82 white plaintiffs testified that they had been 
disturbed by noise and shouting at the church, and by those congregating 
around the church.  Plaintiffs sought to show that “the construction of the 
church would decrease the salable value of the property in that 
community by making it impossible to sell to white people as residence 
property” – though plaintiffs also stated in their brief that:
Property owners . . . are in no wise [sic] prejudiced against the 
negro race, that objections to the building of this church are not 
made solely for the reason that it is a negro church, but discloses 
proof that defendants in error are opposed to the construction of 
any church on said lot.83
The Oklahoma Supreme Court rejected plaintiffs’ claim, stating that no 
case had previously held that a church is a nuisance.84  The Court did not 
credit the evidence of commotion or disorder.  Ultimately, the Court 
seemed to decide against plaintiffs because they were using the lawsuit 
as a device to transform a Black community into a white community.  
The Court stated that:
The plaintiffs have bought property and established their 
residences in what was a negro community at the time the brick 
church was built.  If this congregation should be prohibited from 
constructing the church building no doubt the negro population 
would gradually grow less.  The negro is of a social and religious 
nature.  Their social gatherings are usually at the church . . If they 
are required to build their church in some other community, no 
congregation, housed in a temporary frame shack on the outskirts of town, or of a 
fashionable white congregation, assembled together in a beautiful and costly edifice, 
erected in an exclusive residential district.”  Id.
79
 77 S.W. 669.
80
 231 P. 1074.
81
 7 S.E.2d 635.
82
 231 P. at 1075.  White plaintiffs contended that Black churches in a white 
community “would constitute a nuisance, and thereby decrease the salable value of 
their property.”  The church had bought the property and built a brick church in 1903 or 
1904, before any whites were living in the vicinity.  The structure burned down and the 
church entered into a contract to build a modern new church building.  The evidence 
showed that some of the blocks near the church were predominantly Black while others 
had recently become majority white.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 1075-76.
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doubt their population will trend in that direction.  This appears 
to be the theory of the plaintiffs.85
Petitioners in Boyd v. Board of City Councilmen of the City of 
Frankfurt,86 were members of the First (Colored) Baptist Church who 
had been denied a permit to construct a new church building on their 
land and then arrested for beginning construction.  The Kentucky Court 
of Appeals considered the enforceability of a statute which the Court 
found was “manifestly passed to prevent the erecting of the [First 
(Col ored) Baptist Church] church building “ on the ground that the 
erection of the church and the worship within it would constitute a public 
nuisance.  The court rejected the City Council’s attempt to designate the 
proposed church a nuisance, holding that:  “the term ‘nuisance’ has a 
well-defined legal meaning.  A thing cannot be declared a nuisance 
which is in fact not a nuisance.”87  The court explained that previous case 
law had declared that injunctions are not to be granted for threatened 
nuisances unless such proposed use is a nuisance per se.  Despite some 
residents’ complaints against the loud singing by church members in the 
old building, the court was unwilling to find that the proposed new 
building could be considered a per se nuisance.  Accordingly, the court 
held, the common council was without power to deny the permit as a 
nuisance.88
By contrast, in Morrison v. Rawlinson,89 the South Carolina 
Supreme Court did find the Black church to be a nuisance.  In that case, 
plaintiffs, members of the House of Prayer, a Black church, sought to 
enjoin the Chief of Police and the City Council of Columbia, South 
Carolina from shutting them down as a public nuisance.  Notably, white 
residents had protested the City Council’s decision to grant the church a 
builing permit to construct its church in 1933 to no avail.  However, in 
1938, the City Council relented and declared the church a nuisance.  The 
Court found that services were carried on daily from early in the morning 
til the evening, and resulted in “tumult [that] can be heard for many city 
blocks.”90  The Court stated that “white residents who live in the vicinity 
testified that life is made unbearable by the continual din, which deprives 
them of all peace and tranquility, and makes sleep impossible.”91
The Court held that the church services did not constitute a 
nuisance per se and disagreed with the City Council that it had the power
to declare the House of Prayer a public nuisance without a general 
ordinance.  However, after its own determination that the manner of 
85 Id. at 1076.
86
  77 Sl.W. 669.
87 Id. at 673.
88 Id.  The court also likened the arbitrary power exercised by the city council to the 
facts of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
89
 7 S.E.2d 635.
90 Id. at 638.
91 Id.
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church services constituted a public nuisance the Court ultimately upheld 
the injunction.  While the Court emphasized its “deep and sympathetic 
understanding of this type of worship carried on by members of this 
negro church,”92 it stated that “their form of worship is inseparably 
connected with and accompanied by unrestrained noise and consequent 
public disturbance.”93
2. Funeral Homes and Cemeteries
Challenges to funeral homes and cemeteries regardless of the 
race of the deceased were fairly regular in the late 19th and early 20th
century.94   Treatises generally state that cemeteries and funeral homes 
are not nuisances per se, but that they can become nuisances in 
operation.  The treatises identify a small number of race-neutral cases in 
which cemeteries were found to be nuisances.  Funeral homes in 
residential neighborhoods were regularly found to be nuisances as a 
result of odors from embalming fluid and the like and the fear that 
cadavers might introduce contagious disease.
The race-nuisance challenges to these land uses fall into two 
quite different categories:  white challenges to proposed funereal or 
burial uses by Blacks,95 and challenges on behalf of Blacks to funereal or 
burial uses.  As with the church cases, these challenges met with mixed 
success.  In the first category of cases, the Supreme Court of Georgia 
twice rejected claims that a Black cemetery proposed for a white 
residential neighborhood would constitute a nuisance per se, while the 
Supreme Court of Tennessee in 1932 found that a Black funeral home in 
a white residential neighborhood was properly determined a nuisance per 
se.  In the second, a Florida Court upheld the finding that a cemetery in a 
Black community constituted a nuisance (against a vigorous dissent that 
the majority was improperly crediting the alleged special sensitivities of 
Blacks to death), while a Pennsylvania Court rejected the claim that a 
cemetery in a residential area was a nuisance despite the fact that 
“colored help” would be disinclined to work in the area if a cemetery 
were allowed to be built.  
The Georgia cases are consistent with the treatment of challenges 
to white cemeteries.    In 1933, in Hall v. Moffett,96 the Supreme Court of 
Georgia rejected white plaintiffs’ attempt to enjoin the use of city land 
for a Black cemetery.  Plaintiffs claimed that such use would “be 
detrimental and injurious to the health, happiness, peace and contentment 
92 Id.
93 Id. at 640.
94 See, e.g., H.G. WOOD, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NUISANCES IN THEIR 
VARIOUS FORMS 822 (Albany: 1875).
95 Id. Qualls, 64 S.W.2d 548; Hall, 170 S.E. 193; Killian, 154 S.W.2d 387; Young, 64 
A.2d 814; Jones v. Trawick, 75 So.2d 785.
96
 170 S.E. 193.
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of . . . petitioners as well as a great many others, . . . that it will greatly 
depreciate the value of the property adjacent to said private cemetery,” 
and finally, that “the injury and damage to petitioners’ property and their 
sense of pride in their community will be irreparable.”97  The Court 
reaffirmed the rule that cemeteries are not nuisances per se, and that in 
previous decisions it had held that cemeteries will not be enjoined unless 
likely to contaminate water or air.98   The Supreme Court of Missouri 
also followed this precedent in 1941, rejecting a challenge by Finton O. 
Killian and Gover Sibley to the operation of a cemetery for orthodox 
Jews.99  Even before the orthodox congregation purchased the land, it 
had been designated as a cemetery.  Therefore, it appears clear that 
plaintiffs objected specifically to the fact that Jews would be buried on 
the property.100
In Qualls v. City of Memphis,101 the Supreme Court of Tennessee 
deviated from general precedent by holding that a proposed Black 
funeral home in a white residential area was a nuisance per se.  S.W. 
Qualls, a successful Black funeral home director, brought suit against the 
City of Memphis to challenge the denial of a permit for him to open a 
funeral home in a white residential area.  The area was zoned for 
commercial use, but the City denied Quall’s permit on grounds that a 
funeral home in the area would constitute a nuisance per se, “whether for 
the white or colored race,” because of possible emissions of odors and 
noises.102  However, the Board resolution then stated:
While the Board is of the opinion and finds, that it cannot and 
will not discriminate against said S.W. Qualls, because he is a 
member of the colored race, or because he intends to conduct a 
funeral home on the premises for colored persons, yet the Board 
finds, from the proof, that members of the colored race are very 
emotional, and that funerals of members of that race are attended 
by loud speaking, singing, moaning, and other sounds which 
would be obnoxious and offensive to persons in the immediate 
neighborhood.103
The Tennessee Supreme Court rejected Qualls’ argument that the 
Board discriminated on the grounds of race.  Instead, the Court credited 
the Board’s conclusion that the plot was too small for use as a funeral 
97 Id.
98 Id.  The Court also rejected the claim that an existing public cemetery for negroes 
should be the basis for denying the use of city land for a private cemetery stating:  “We 
can see no reason why even a negro should not prefer to rest after death from both 
hun ger and hardship.”  Id.
99 Killian, 154 S.W.2d 387.
100 Id.
101
  15 Tenn. App. 575 (1932).
102 Id. at 577.
103 Id. at 578.
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home and indeed, blamed Qualls for purchasing the property in a white 
neighborhood in the first place:   “Mr. Qualls purchased this property 
with full knowledge that it was in a residential district, and occupied as 
homes by white people, and he must have known that a funeral home 
conducted in this building within a very few feet, eight or ten feet, of 
homes occupied by families, would be very objectionable and very 
distasteful.”104
However, in a related case, published a year later, the Court of 
Appeals of Tennessee held for Mr. Qualls when he sought a permit to 
use the downstairs of the same property as a showroom for caskets and 
the upstairs as a family residence.105  While the language of the first case 
involving Mr. Qualls suggests that the decision was based in significant 
part on the race of the plaintiffs and defendants, the Court in the second 
Qualls case did not use race as an excuse to rule for the white neighbors 
who were resistant to Mr. Qualls’ presence.  The second Qualls case is in 
some sense more akin to the “mere presence” cases described in the 
earlier section.
In the second category of “death cases” in which the allegedly 
special sensitivities of Blacks to the presence of cemeteries were at issue, 
the courts reached conflicting results.106  Both cases involved residential 
communities attempting to enjoin the establishment of a cemetery on 
grounds that it would change the character of the neighborhood with 
increased visitors and traffic, noise, potential groundwater 
contamination. The plaintiffs in these cases also alleged that thoughts of 
death would be generally annoying, but would cause particular harm to 
Blacks.  Young v. St. Martins,107 however, was brought by wealthy white 
residents, who claimed the cemetery would create a difficulty keeping 
“colored help” while Jones v. Trawick appears to have been brought by 
Black plaintiffs.108
104 Id. at 582.
105 City of Memphis v. Qualls, 64 S.W.2d 548 (1933), aff’d.  The court found that the 
zoning ordinance provided no basis for denying the permit, and held that “it cannot be 
said that [the use] would be a nuisance per se.  It cannot be said that it would occasion 
unusual noises, or odors, or emotional expressions or street traffic congestions.  Id. at 
551.
106 Young, 64 A.2d 814; Jones v. Trawick, 75 So.2d 785. 
107
 In Young, the Supreme Court in Pennsylvania held that the alleged “psychic” 
objections were insufficient because equity “does not regard the melancholy reflections 
that may be engendered in sensitive minds by the close proximity as sufficient to brand
it a nuisance within the legal meaning of that term.”   The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ 
attempt to analogize between cemeteries and funeral homes since the latter but not the 
former involved the possible vapors from the embalming and autopsies, as well as 
possible danger of infection.  64 A.2d 814.
108 In Jones, the Florida Supreme Court, in an en banc decision, rejected this precedent.  
The Court stated that while it had not decided the issue of whether a funeral home in a 
residential area would constitute a nuisance, it agreed with lower court, on the ground 
that contact with funeral homes “may result in great discomfort, depression and 
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The majority decision in the Florida case does not mention the 
race of the plaintiffs or the race of those to be buried in the cemetery.  
However, the dissent contends that the race of the plaintiffs was central 
to the holding.  The dissenting Justices note that the area was covenanted 
to restrict occupancy to Blacks, and stated that:
[I]t is insisted, in effect, that because of the peculiar aversion of 
Negroes to graveyards and the extreme lament of colored 
mourners, the normal lives of the appellants would be so affected 
as to render the use as a cemetery of the property so near them a 
nuisance.109
The dissent argued against deciding a case based upon particular 
aversions of one race:  “I cannot agree that what might be a nuisance for 
one race would not be a nuisance for another.”110
3. Hospitals, Sanatoriums, and Orphanages
Homeowners often objected to the presence hospitals, 
sanatoriums and orphanages in their midst even when race was not at 
issue.  As with cemeteries and funeral homes, treatises from the decades 
in which the race-nuisance cases were brought state that such institutions 
are not nuisances per se, but can become nuisances in operation.  Of the 
four  race-nuisance cases challenging these sorts of land uses, only Giles 
v. Rawlings, decided by the Supreme Court of Georgia in 1918, found 
that such a claim was cognizable.111
In Giles v. Rawlings, a white plaintiff, J.P. Giles, sought to enjoin 
the operation of a hospital for Blacks.  The neighborhood in which the 
hospital was operating was largely residential, except for a hospital 
operated by Rawlings for white people.  Rawlings decided to transform a 
small house at the rear of the hospital into a hospital for Blacks, which 
was across the street from Giles’ home.  Giles claimed he and his family 
were unable to enjoy their home as a result of the obnoxious odors, the 
noise from patients “whether from the effects of being treated, or from 
their nature,” the sight of the negro patients, and finally, the noise from 
the carrying of the dead from the hospital.112  The lower court had denied 
the injunction, refusing to hold that the hospital was a nuisance per se 
and, finding that plaintiffs had an adequate remedy at law.  The Georgia 
Supreme Court reversed;  it did not hold that the hospital was a nuisance 
per se, but  that plaintiff had a right to invoke the aid of equity.  The 
ultimate resolution is unreported.      
unhappy thoughts.”  The Court then extended the rule generally applicable to funeral 
homes to cemeteries. 75 So.2d 785.
109 Id. at 789 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
110 Id.
111
 97 S.E. 521 (1918).
112 Id. at 521-22.
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In 1924, in City Council of City and County of Denver v. the 
United Negro Protection Ass’n,113 the Colorado Supreme Court 
unanimously granted the United Negroes Protective Association’s 
request for a writ of mandamus against the Denver City Council, 
compelling the City to grant it a permit to operate a home for Black aged 
and an orphanage for Black children.   According to the Court, a large 
number of residents of the neighborhood protested the petition for a 
permit to open the home on the ground that “such an institution would be 
detrimental to the public health and safety of the people living in the 
vicinity.”114  The committee on health agreed without investigation and 
at the same meeting, the council denied the permit.  
The Court found the decision to be arbitrary and without 
justification, particularly since the area was heavily industrial and, most 
relevant perhaps, “another institution for white children . . . of the same 
general character” was operating on the same block.115   The Court 
rejected the City’s claim that the decision was fully within its discretion, 
finding that municipal decisions were not beyond the control of the 
courts when they are arbitrary or the result of gross abuse of discretion.  
Unlike the Giles Court, which made no mention of the unchallenged 
white hospital, the Colorado Court thus appeared to equate the presence 
of Black and white children.
The Mississippi Supreme Court in Redmond v. State,116 decided 
in 1928, denied the State Attorney General’s suit for an injunction to 
prohibit a Black man, H.R. Redmond, from administering drugs and 
medicine.  The Attorney General alleged that Redmond was “an ignorant 
and illiterate person of the colored race” who was treating patients in 
unsanitary conditions, causing a public nuisance.”  According to state 
testimony, “the conditions at Redmond’s office were unclean:  flies, 
spiders, and roaches also being in some of the concoctions”, and they 
found the presence of white girls, one with “underclothing . . . above her 
knees.”117
The Court concluded that Redmond was practicing medicine 
without a license, but held that an injunction was not a proper remedy.  
The Court reasoned that at common law, a license was not necessary to 
prescribe medicine; Redmond’s operation was therefore not a nuisance 
per se.  Mississippi had enacted a statute that provided for a jury 
determination of whether a certain practice injured the health and was a 
nuisance.  Accordingly, the Court held that Redmond had a right to a 
jury trial:  “It is a delicate, though often a necessary, thing to condemn a 
business operated by a citizen.  It may result in great loss, or even ruin, 
113
 230 P. 598 (1924).
114 Id. at 599.
115 Id.
116
 118 So. 360 (1928).
117 Id. at 363
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to his business.  The Legislature, realizing the delicacy of the power 
conferred, . . . .has provided a jury, and the cause should have been 
proceeded with under that statute.”118
In Mitchell v. Deisch,119 decided in 1929, Ms. Frances Mitchell 
and other white landowners sought to enjoin the construction of the 
Arkansas Negro Tuberculosis Sanatorium near their homes as contrary to 
the state’s policy of segregating the races and as a nuisance.  The Court 
rejected the first claim on the ground that the decision of where to locate 
the sanatorium was within the Board’s province.  It rejected the second 
as well, supported by evidence that sanatoriums do not affect land values 
and case law and treatises for the proposition that sanatoriums and 
hospitals do not constitute nuisances per se.  It is not clear from the 
appellate opinion whether plaintiffs argued that a sanatorium for Blacks 
in an otherwise white community should be considered a nuisance even 
if one for whites would not have been.  Justice Mehaffy dissented, 
claiming that the location of the sanatorium in a white community 
violated the statute directing the Board to locate the facility near the 
Negro community, claiming “the Legislature would refuse to locate a 
tuberculosis sanatorium for white people among negroes.  One would be 
as bad as the other, and each, in my judgment, would be in violation of 
the policy of the state.”120
4. Places of Amusement
Courts generally held that places of amusement such as 
playgrounds, athletic fields, gardens, dance halls, and theatres were not 
nuisances per se, but could become so in operation.  Saloons, except 
during prohibition, were similarly treated.   In the race nuisance cases, 
courts generally refused to enjoin the operation of places of amusements 
for Blacks, despite white protest.
In 1931, in Jones v. Little Rock Boys Club, the Supreme Court of 
Arkansas refused to enjoin the construction of a club for underprivileged 
boys.121  Similarly, in 1943, the Supreme Court of North Carolina, in 
Dudley v. City of Charlotte,122 refused to enjoin the City of Charlotte 
from establishing a public park for Blacks.  Both Courts relied upon 
precedent that places of amusement are not nuisances per se.   
Two cases, Theonebe v. Mosby,123 decided by the Supreme Court 
of Pennsylvania in 1917, and Green v. State ex rel. Chatham,124 decided 
decades later by the Supreme Court of Mississippi in 1952, involved 
118 Id. at 369.
119
 18 S.W.2d 364 (1929).
120 Id. at 368 (Mehaffy, J., dissenting).
121
 34 S.W.2d 222.  The race of the underprivileged boys is not entirely clear – so this 
could be a class-nuisance rather than a race-nuisance case.
122




 56 So.2d 12.
25
challenges to extant dance halls.  Both Courts reaffirmed the principle 
that dance halls are not per se nuisances, but they diverged in their 
findings as to whether the dance halls at issue were nuisances in fact.  In 
Theonebe, the Court refused to grant the white residents’ request for an 
injunction to limit the hours of a dance hall patronized by “colored 
people.”125  The Court found that the patrons were “respectable, well-
behaved people,” and since the neighborhood was not strictly residential, 
residents must endure some noise from commercial and business 
establishments.126   The race of the patrons is noted as a fact, but not 
discussed in the conclusions of law.  By contrast, the Court in Green
determined a nuisance a “juke box” that attracted large numbers of “the 
colored race” who danced, shouted and sang into the early morning 
hours of Sunday, depriving other residents of their sleep.127  The Court 
appeared to be particularly troubled by the “swearing and unprintable 
profanity” to which the neighborhood women and children were 
subjected.128  The situation was exacerbated by “calls of nature” for 
which there were no facilities, resulting in indecent exposure and 
horrible odors.129  The Court found that the dance hall constituted a 
public nuisance, but limited its injunction, holding that the owner was 
restricted from playing the juke box during worship hours or too late at 
night.  The Court resorted to a contextual definition of public nuisance --
“whatever shocks the public morals and sense of decency; whatever 
shocks the religious feelings of the community or tends to its 
discomfort”130
Generally, courts distinguished between disorderly and orderly 
saloons, determining that the disorderly ones constituted a nuisance.131
In Fox v. Corbitt,132 for example, white homeowners challenged a grocer 
operating a saloon.  In that case, the Court granted the white residents’ 
request for an injunction, stating that the place was “in every sense of the 
word a “negro dive” in which “large crowds of negroes of low order” 
assembled.133  The Court relied, along with racist stereotypes, on proof 
that people got drunk and had fights on the sidewalk and the 
“unmentionable indecencies and exposures of their persons.”134
125
  101 A.98 at 98.
126 Id.
127
 56 So.2d at 13.
128 Id. at 16.
129 Id. at 13.
130 Id. at 16.
131 However, in Smith v. Commonwealth, a case decided before the Civil War, the 
Kentucky Court of Appeals held that even the peaceable congregation of slaves at a 
grocery selling liquor constituted a public nuisance because of the illegality of selling
alcohol to slaves.  45 Ky. 21 (1845).
132
 194 S.W. 88.




I have identified two cases in which white plaintiffs succeeded in 
designating as nuisances densely populated areas inhabited by Blacks or 
Mexicans.  In Harty v. Guerra,135 decided by an appellate court in Texas 
in 1925, the court found that defendants created a nuisance in a “white 
residential neighborhood” by dividing a home and stable into rooms 
housing up to 50 Mexican “peons,” who kept cows and fowl, maintained 
a “din of noises from musical instruments, singing, wood 
chopping,…[and] the barking of dogs.136  The court likened the 
conditions to the operation of a cotton gin, polluting factory, and the 
housing of cattle, and issued an injunction against the nuisance-like 
conditions.   However, the opinion does not clarify exactly which 
conduct was enjoined or whether the residents were expected to move.137
Indeed, the court specificially held that “[t]his order is, of course, not to 
be interpreted as prohibiting the indulgence in music or the cutting of 
wood upon the premises at reasonable hours and in such a manner as not 
reasonably to interfere with the rights of appellants.”138
Similarly, in the last race-nuisance case, Wright v. DeFatta, 
decided in 1962, plaintiffs sought to enjoin the defendant from “placing 
an excessive number of Negro dwellings contrary to the Municipal 
Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance.”139  The court held that such a gross 
violation of the zoning ordinance constituted a nuisance per se.  
III. THEORIES AND COUNTER-THEORIES
135
  269 S.W. 1064.
136 Id. at 1065. The defendants failed to appear in either the trial or appeal and so the 
facts are entirely the characterizations of plaintiffs.  The court reprinted them in some 
detail:
they further constantly carried on and permitted to occur, practically 
throughout the whole of the night, such a din of noises from musical 
instruments, singing, wood chopping, the barking of dogs, crowing of 
chickens, and other performances as to make the usual and customary hours of 
the nights for slumber in that neighborhood so hideous that appellants were 
continually being deprived of necessary rest and sleep, and were at times 
forced to leave their home to obtain it.
Id.
137
 The court states that “this order is, of course, not to be interpreted as prohibiting the 
indulgence in music or the cutting of wood upon the premises at reasonable hours and 
in such a manner as not reasonably to interfere with the rights of the appellants.”  Id. at 
1064.
138 Id. at 1065.
139
 142 So.2d 489.
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Legal opinions are rich materials for insight into how the ruling 
elites within the particular states sought to express and understand their 
own moral and legal ideals.140  As Robert Gordon has argued:
Because [legal opinions] are the most rationalized and elaborated 
legal products, you'll find in them an exceptionally refined and 
concentrated version of legal consciousness. Moreover, if you 
can crack the codes of these mandarin texts, you'll often have 
tapped into a structure that isn't at all peculiar to lawyers but that 
is the prototype speech behind many different dialect discourses 
in the society.141
This Part will use the race nuisance cases to test the explanatory 
power of several prevailing scholarly theories of the role of courts during 
the Jim Crow era.  The cases obviously refute the prevailing view that 
the courts were mere engines of white supremecy, openly eschewing the 
rule of law.  Instead, the cases show that no single theory is fully 
explanatory.  The cases reflect a strain of reflexive formalism and a 
surprising concern for the ideal of race neutrality.  When the race 
nuisance cases are seen in concern with other attempts to whites to 
pursue residential segregation, however, many support Derrick Bell’s 
interest convergence argument.142
A. State Courts Furthering White Supremecy
The Jim Crow era has been described as a “time when race 
relations in law, politics, and general social contemplation hit rock-
bottom levels of injustice and callousness.”143  Randall Kennedy refers to 
140 See MARK TUSHNET, SLAVE LAW IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH: STATE V. MANN IN 
HISTORY AND LITERATURE 18 (University Press of Kansas: 2003) 18 (quoting Winthrop 
Jordan).  Tushnet also quotes Eugene Genovese’s description of such cases as setting 
out the standards of decency of a world in which “like most worlds, men strove to be 
considered decent.” Id.
141
   Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 57, 120 (1984).
142
 Bell, supra note __.
143
 Schmitt, supra note __, at 446.  Schmitt’s article, however, is an exploration of the 
series of cases decided during the Supreme Court during this era that breathed life into 
the then dormant Civil Rights amendments.  These cases include:  Bailey v. Alabama, 
219 U.S. 219 (1911) and United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133 (1914), in which the 
Court applied the 13th Amendment to strike down peonage laws, and Buchanan, 245 
U.S. 60, in which the Court held that the 14th Amendment precludes de jure residential 
segregation.  The latter case was cited by several state courts in the race nuisance cases 
and will be discussed more fully infra.  But see Kennedy, supra note __, at 1650. 
Kennedy both rejects Schmitt’s description of academic attitudes toward the Supreme 
Court during the Progressive era, providing examples of earlier scholars who praised 
the Court’s under Chief Justice Edward White for beginning the “modern movement for 
black equality in the United States”, and more generally criticizes Schmitt’s 
“celebration” of the White Court.  Kennedy argues that the Court was at bottom racist 
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it as the “Age of Segregation,”144 and Cheryl Harris calls it “a time of 
acute crisis for Blacks.”145  Between 1890 and 1907, Mississippi, South 
Carolina, Louisiana, North Carolina, Alabama, Oklahoma, and Georgia 
all amended their constitutions to disenfranchise virtually all Black 
people.146  Florida, Arkansas, Tennessee, and Texas statutorily employed 
devices such as poll taxes to accomplish the same ends.147  While the 
Supreme Court decided some cases that prevented Black 
disenfranchisement, Blacks were not truly enfranchised again in the 
South until the enactment of the Voting Rights Act in 1966.148  In 
addition to constitutionally and statutorily disenfranchising Blacks, the 
Southern and Border states were also enacting segregation laws 
beginning with education and moving toward transportation, public 
accommodations, cemeteries, hospitals, prisons, and, infamously, 
drinking fountains.149
Perhaps not surprisingly then, many scholars hold the view that 
state courts in the Jim Crow era abandoned the rule of law when issues 
of race emerged and became tools of racial subordination.  In a recent 
revisionist account of civil rights lawyering that otherwise provides a 
facsciating and rich account of the development of civil rights legal 
strategies, Professor Kenneth Mack asserts generally that the common 
law was “not neutral with regard to race, but was subject to 
discriminatory decisionmaking.”150  In his discussion of the similarities 
and differences between racism in state courts during Apartheid era 
South Africa and Jim Crow America, the late A. Leon Higginbothom 
concluded with a general theory that these courts exemplified much of 
the racism present in the larger society.151  He argued that the cases he 
analyzed “reflect the ways in which the courts have directly or indirectly 
contributed to the maintenance of black subjugation within an 
and rejected more progressive models of constitutional interpretation, thus, that 
Schmitt’s praise was unwarranted.   
144
   Kennedy, supra note __, at 1650.
145
   Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1746 (1993).
146 Id. at 178.
147 Id.
148 KLARMAN, JIM CROW, supra note __, at 86.
149 See AUGUST MEIER & ELLIOTT RUDWICK, FROM PLANTATION TO GHETTO 184 
(New York: 1970); Schmitt, supra note __, at 454-473.
150
 Kenneth W. Mack, Rethinking Civil Rights Lawyering and Politics in the Era 
Before Brown, 115 YALE L. J. 256, n54 (2004).
151
   The late Judge Higginbotham examined segregation and overt discrimination in 
Jim Crow courts, as well as “more insidious forms of court-enforced racism, including:  
refusal to accord black witnesses the civilities customarily accorded to white witnesses; 
attacks on the credibility of blacks as witnesses or accused; prosecutorial appeals to fear 
of violence by blacks; reliance on claims that racial minorities have a propensity toward 
violence; use of racist comments; and overtly racist conduct by judges.”  A. Leon 
Higginbotham, Jr., Racism in American and South African Courts:  Similarities and 
Differences, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 479, 521 (1990).
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interlocking system of discriminatory practices and beliefs.”152
Higginbotham further concluded that during the Jim Crow era, “the 
courts, and along with them, the rule of law, became not impartial 
arbiters of societal relations but instead the mirror and enforcer of 
property interests.”153
In her study, The Pig Farmer’s Daughter and Other Tales of 
American Justice, Mary Frances Berry is equally critical of state courts 
during the Jim Crow era. 154 In her analysis of involving the interplay of 
race and sex in the courts from the post-Civil War era to the present, 
Berry concluded: “Judges continued to affirm the old story of propertied 
white male privilege and racial subordination.” 155  Interestingly, Berry 
rests this conclusion on courts’ willingess to uphold wills that granted
property to Black women and mixed-race children.156
Benno Schmitt agreed:  “law was the foundation of the structure 
of racial separation” beginning with the informal practices of sheriffs and 
judges.157   He also claimed that:  “Jim Crow laws reflected a society that 
felt itself under no constraint to treat blacks equally, not even in the 
formal constraint of legal fiction.”158
Michael Klarman has been less categorical.  His recent book 
From Jim Crow to Civil Rights carefully distinguished between different 
decades in the late 19th and early 20th century.  While he has agreed with 
Schmitt that the Progressive era was a period “before the culturally elite 
values of judges translated into egalitarian racial ideals,”159 he 
acknowledged that southern judges after World War I began to overturn 
some egregious convictions of black defendants.  Klarman claimed on 
the one hand that state courts’ “proud pretentions to color-blind justice 
were absurd”160 in light of the barriers to Blacks’ equal participation in 
the legal system.  However, he also granted that judges may have 
believed their own rhetoric.  He ultimately concludes that any “liberal 
sentiment tended to evaporate in cases that were perceieved to involve 
broader challenges to white supremacy or that generated criticisms of 
white southerners.”161In such a state court system, however, we would expect nuisance 
suits seeking to protect white landowners from the presence of Black 
152 Id. at 529.
153 Id. at 526.
154 BERRY, supra note __ at 91.
155 Id. at 91.
156
  “In inheritance case after inheritance case Southern state courts between 1868 and 
1900 upheld the power of propertied white men to leave estates to their African 
American mistresses and their children.”  Id. at 85.
157
  Schmitt, supra note __, at 472.
158 Id. at 474.
159 KLARMAN, JIM CROW, supra note __ at 81.
160
   Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 26 (working paper 
No.00-5).
161 KLARMAN, JIM CROW, supra note __, at 131.
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families to have been successful. Nuisance doctrine itself did not clearly 
preclude such a result.   As John Nagle acknowledges, “virtually 
anything could interfere with someone’s use and enjoyment of land.”162
Indeed, an early English treatise included as a common nuisance 
“subdividing houses in good neighborhoods ‘that become hurtful to the 
place by overpestring it with the poor.’”163  If common law English 
courts found that the presence of poor people constituted a nuisance, why 
did post-Reconstruction American courts not similarly judge the 
presence racial minorities?  The realist critique would certainly have 
suggested such a result. But, as we have seen, they did not.  Instead, the 
cases stand squarely against the claims of many scholars that state courts 
expressly eschewed any need to apply the rule of law equally to Blacks.
If the commonly held view is inaccurate, what was motivating 
these judges?  The next section will consider the most obvious counter-
theory:  that these judges were strict rule-of-law formalists.
B. Reflexive Formalism in Operation?
It seems unlikely that the all of the many judges who decided the 
race-nuisance cases were closet anti-racists.  Therefore, the most logical 
counter-explanation to the commonly held view is that the judges were 
simply acting in conformance with the prevailing jurisprudence of the 
day.  The late 19th century and very early 20th century is often described 
as an era of reflexive formalism, so perhaps nuisance doctrine itself 
accounts for the cases.164 Indeed, this theory offers an explanation for 
Berry’s inheritance cases; she notes:  “The courts decided to base their 
decisions on the formal legal rule that the law would implement the 
proven will of the testator.”165 To test this theory in the nuisance 
context, this section explores the contours of nuisance doctrine as 
applied by the judges in the race-nuisance cases and more significantly, 
assesses whether that doctrine actually operated as a constraint upon the 
judges’ own preferred outcome.  
162
  Nagle, supra note __, at 275.
163
   J.R. Spencer, Public Nuisance – A Critical Examination, 48 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 55, 
60 (1989) (quoting William Sheppard, The Court-Keeper’s Guide, or a Plain and 
Familiar Treatise needful and useful for the help of many that are employed in the 
keeping of Law-days, or courts Baron, 5th ed. 1662).  Spencer states that other treatises 
suggest that courts condemned property subdivision because they feared that the poor 
would catch the plague, “not that they were one.”  Id. at 60 n.15.  However, the 
language cited clearly suggests that the presence of poor people creates harm.
164 See Eric Claeyes, supra note __.
165 BERRY, supra note __, at 83.
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This counter-theory is helpful.  The cases suggest that formalist 
judging often prevailed then – as it often does now.166  However, when 
considered with the related cases involving restrictive covenants and 
racial zoning, race and land use cases cannot ultimately support a 
particularly robust version of formalism.  Two doctrinal principles 
emerge as most determinate in the race nuisance cases.  First, a proposed
land use was generally not a nuisance, and second, a use that caused only 
psychic or social harms was generally not a nuisance.  There were 
exceptions to these principles, however.  If a use was labeled a “per se” 
nuisance, it could be enjoined prior to operation, and second, 
psychological or social harms involving the specter of death, such as 
cemeteries and funeral homes, or the harms caused by immoral behavior, 
such as prostitution, were sometimes considered a nuisance.  As a result, 
like the theory of courts-as-pawns, reflexive formalism fails to explain 
the range of decisions in these cases.  
The most significant doctrinal constraint appears to have been 
courts’ reluctance to grant an injunction in anticipatory nuisance cases.  
Of the 28 cases, 19 involved attempts to enjoin anticipatory nuisances
and only three of these were successful.167  By contrast, in the nine cases 
in which plaintiffs sought to enjoin present nuisances, courts found 
nuisances in five of the cases.168
Courts denying injunctions for proposed land uses often referred 
to some version of the maxim that:
Where an injunction is sought merely on the ground that a lawful 
erection will be put to a use that will constitute a nuisance, the 
court will ordinarily refuse to restrain the construction or 
completion of the erection leaving the complainant free, however, 
to assert his rights thereafter in an appropriate manner if the 
contemplated use results in a nuisance.169
166
   This conclusion runs counter to those who would contend that judges are rarely if 
ever controlled by any items of “traditional law.”  See Frederick Schauer, Incentives, 
Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of Judicial Behavior, 68 U. Cin. L. Rev. 
615, 618 (2000) (describing legal realist and attitudinal model of judicial 
decisionmaking).  It is not, however, a particularly radical conclusion – and has support 
even among adherents to critical legal studies.  See DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF 
ADJUDICATION  13 (Harvard University Press, 1997).
167 Wright, 142 So.2d 489; Qualls, 64 S.W.2d 548; and Jones v. Trawick, 75 So.2d 
785.
168 Green, 56 So.2d 12; Morrison, 7 S.E.2d 635; Fox, 194 S.W. 88; Giles, 97 S.E. 52; 
Harty 269 S.W. 1064.
169 Jones v. Little Rock, 34 S.W. at 224 (citing Murphy v. Cupp) (“The rule is well 
settled that no injunction will be issued in advance of the structure unless it be certain 
that the same will constitute a nuisance.”); City Council of City and County of Denver, 
76 Colo. at 89 (“The question before the trial court for determination was not, and it is 
not here, whether such an institution might or might not be so conducted or operated in 
the future as to become such.”); and Baptist Church, 178 S.W. at 690 (“A jail is not a 
structure which in itself is a nuisance, nor does it necessarily become such by using it 
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This principle has long been recognized by nuisance scholars and clearly 
provides a powerful explanation for the outcome of a significant number 
of the race-nuisance cases.
However, courts did not always apply this doctrine.170 In Qualls, 
for example, the Board of Adjustment of the City of Memphis found that 
the operation of a funeral home on the particular lot in question would be 
a nuisance as a matter of law because of the emission of odors and 
noises.  Mr. Qualls challenged this finding, arguing that the Board could 
not find as a fact that his business would a nuisance prior to its operation. 
The Court agreed with the Board that the funeral home could be 
considered a nuisance per se, holding that to place such an institution 
near a residence would result in a condition of “discomfort and 
inconvenience.”171 Though the following year, Mr. Qualls was allowed 
to operate a casket show room and to move into the living quarters
above.172The second doctrinal constraint appears to be the ad coelum rule, 
under which property owners are “entitled to be free from all physical
invasions across the borders of their land,”173 but not necessarily to be 
free from more inchoate assaults to a property owner’s social or 
psychological state.  Yet courts ignored this rule as well.  
Nuisance law historically recognized harm across a broad 
spectrum.174 On one end was the standard nuisance case involving air 
pollution (smoke or soot) that caused an actual physical harm.175  In the 
middle of the spectrum were cases involving loud noises or noxious 
odors which did not result in injury but which were readily identified as 
sensory harms.176  At the furthest end of the spectrum we see a doctrinal 
shift – some courts were sympathetic to claims of emotional harm 
emanating from the presence of dead people or people engaged in what 
was considered illicit or immoral conduct.177
In the death cases, for example, some courts agreed that the 
proximity of a funeral home or (in fewer cases) a cemetery caused “great 
for the purpose for which it is erected. It might become such in the manner of its use, 
and, if so, its maintenance in that manner could be and should be enjoined.”); see
Falloon, quoting High, Injunctions, § 488.
170
   Virtually every case in which a court rejected a request for a preliminary 
injunction began with a discussion of whether the proposed use constituted a nuisance 
per se.  See, e.g., Dudley, 223 N.C. at 639 and Qualls, 64 S.W.2d 548. 
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   64 S.W.2d at 550.
172 Id. at 548.
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   For a full discussion of the ad coelum rule and the “physical-invasion” conception 
of property, see Claeyes, supra note __, at 4-6.  
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   Nagle, supra note __, at 280-90.
175 Godsil, supra note __, at 1851.
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   Nagle, supra note __, at 281-85.
177 Id. at 277-286 (discussing early 20th century nuisance challenges to bawdy houses, 
saloons, gambling parlors, and cemeteries). 
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discomfort, depression and unhappy thoughts,”178“depression, 
nervousness, lying awake at night, children made excited”179 and the 
“dampening effect” on the use of outdoor spaces.180  In the bawdy house 
cases, courts considered the sights and sounds of the prostitutes and 
customers offensive to neighboring residents; the presence of the activity 
caused the property values in the neighborhood to decline and rendered 
the properties unfit for families.181
The harms alleged in the death and bawdy house cases were not 
unlike those alleged in the race-nuisance cases.  In Falloon, the plaintiff 
claimed that the presence of a Black family close to his property would 
“annoy plaintiff’s wife, who is a person of delicate health.”182  In Worm 
v. Wood, plaintiffs claimed that the shacks would be occupied by 
“negroes, Mexicans, and a low class of white people, which will greatly 
injure and practically destroy social conditions in the neighborhood” and 
would thus “greatly depreciate plaintiff’s property.”183  Most vividly, in 
Lancaster v. Harwood, plaintiffs alleged that the presence of a Black 
family a few feet away results in an odor that is “offensive, 
objectionable, and undesirable, and in a southern climate is so bad as to 
destroy the comfortable enjoyment of life in close proximity thereto, and 
is offensive at a distance of 10 to 15 feet to white persons of ordinary 
sensibilities, and of ordinary tastes and habits.”184
In light of the racial mores of the late 19th and early 20th
centuries, it would not have been surprising if courts had applied the 
reasoning in the death and bawdy house cases to the race-nuisance cases 
and found that the presence of a Black family in a white neighborhood 
constituted a nuisance per se.  In other words, nuisance doctrine alone 
cannot explain the outcome in the race nuisance cases.  It still remains to 
be determined why courts did not place the presence of Black families in 
white neighborhoods in the same category as funeral homes or bawdy 
houses – uses that do not cause a physical harm, but allegedly result in 
declining property values and an inability to enjoy their homes.  
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C. A Race Neutrality Ideal at Work?
This section considers whether the principle or ideal of equal 
treatment under law was itself the explanation for why race mixing was 
not added to the list of “per se” nuisances.  This principle was,
obviously, not found in common law.  However, in response to the 
“Black Codes” that proliferated in the post-Civil War South, the 
Reconstruction Congress enacted  by the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which 
provided to all persons regardless of race “the same right, in every State 
and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, 
be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and 
convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all 
laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is 
enjoyed by white citizens.”185 Therefore, Congress enshrined in law the 
rights of Blacks to private property.  
The first case in which a plaintiff sought a legal injunction 
against the presence of a Black family, Falloon v. Schilling, was decided 
in 1883 in Kansas, toward the end of Reconstruction and in a border 
state.186  Nuisance doctrine was not entirely dispositive – though it 
militated against a finding for the plaintiffs.  In addition to nuisance 
doctrine, the Court had as a background principle the Civil Rights Act of 
1866 – and the language of the opinion tracks the Civil Rights Act and 
the ideals underlying its passage.  As noted above, in Falloon, the Court 
stated: Equity will not interfere simply because the occupants of such 
house are by reason of race, color, or habits disagreeable or 
offensive.187
The opinion went on:
The law makes no distinction on account of race or color, and 
recognizes no prejudices arising therefrom.  As long as the 
neighbor’s family is well behaved, it matters not what the color, 
race, or habits may be, or how offensive personally or socially, it 
may be to plaintiff; plaintiff has no cause of complaint in the 
courts.188
The author of this opinion, Justice David Brewer, is an interesting 
figure.  He is known as among the most conservative of the “four 
horsemen” on the United States Supreme Court.  On the other hand, in a 
book entitled The United States as a Christian Nation, he wrote:
Certainly, to me it is the supreme conviction, growing stronger as 
the years go by, that this one purpose of Providence in the life of 
185 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
186
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this Republic, and that to this end we are to take from every race 
its strongest and best elements and characteristics, and mold and 
fuse them into one homogenous American life.189
Brewer thus appeared to hold certain integrationist tendencies. This view 
should not be overstated, however, since he was also the author of the 
majority opinion in Berea College v. Kentucky, upholding the 
constitutionality of a Kentucky statute that prohibited integrated 
education.190  Brewer noted that:  "the right to teach white and negro
children in a private school at the same time and place is not a property 
right. Besides, appellant as a corporation created by this State has no 
natural right to teach at all. Its right to teach is such as the State sees fit 
to give to it. The State may withhold it altogether, or qualify it.”191
An even more complex question is whether the same picture of 
race neutrality or equal treatment also prevailed  in the “mere presence” 
cases following Falloon, all of which occurred during more racist 
periods and often in the deep South. The outcomes of the cases are the 
same:  Worm, Kiersky, and Lancaster all denied white families’ requests 
for injunctions preventing Blacks and other reviled groups from locating 
in their neighborhoods.192 However, these cases do not similarly 
celebrate the ideal of race neutrality or norms of racial equality.  Worm 
and Kiersky simply applied precedent without an extended discussion of 
the norms underlying the precedent so appear unconcerned with 
governing ideals.193
Lancaster is more difficult to categorize and requires more 
extended analysis.194  The opinion belabors plaintiffs’ racist contentions 
– particularly in contrast to Kiersky in which the court calls plaintiffs’ 
claims of race nuisance “mere surplusage.”195  In their legal analysis, the 
judges go to some length to criticize the ideals of equal treatment, but in 
the end, they follow them.  The judges lament that precedent prevents 
them from “following our own personal sentiments, which, as 
individuals we are frank to admit, are wholly with the appellee.”196  The 
judges then explain that “we as a court, must follow as our only guide, 
the rules of law applicable alike to all, bearing in mind that the law is no 
respecter of persons and was not made to apply to once caste to the 
exclusion of another.”197  The judges end with the statement:  “we feel 
constrained to say that the record in this case discloses the inefficiency of 
189 DAVID J. BREWER, THE UNITED STATES AS A CHRISTIAN NATION 81 (1905).
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the law to prevent all acts of injustice from being inflicted.”198  The 
opinion is firmly rooted in legal positivism with its express delinking of 
law and justice or morality.  In addition, in one sense, the opinion can be 
seen as affirming race neutrality in its suggestion that law cannot apply 
differently to one group than another.  On the other hand, by choosing to 
express their affinity for the racist views of Mrs. Lancaster, the judges 
are also sending a message of racial hostility and intolerance.     
The cases following Falloon were decided in the “nadir” of race 
relations in this country.199  Why did these judges not abandon the 
precedent set in Falloon and find for the white plaintiffs who sought to 
exclude Blacks from their midsts?200  We would expect the judges in the 
more dramatically racist periods of the 1890s through the 1930s to have 
rejected the norm of equal treatment exemplified in Falloon.  The 
opinions suggest that these judges were acting as reflexive formalists.201
D. Formalism and Equal Treatment Reconsidered – Racial Zoning 
and Restrictive Covenants
If the race nuisance can be explained through a combination of 
nuisance doctrine and the ideal of equal treatment of the races under law, 
this paper seems to present a much more egalitarian vision of law in the 
Jim Crow era than one would ever have anticipated.202
198 Id.
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While race was certainly a factor in some of these cases and the 
language and stereotypes that emerge are very troubling to a modern 
reader, race did not uniformly dictate outcomes nor were judges blithely 
ignoring the norm of equal treatment.   However, this small set of cases 
was only the first legal maneuver whites used to entrench racial 
segregation and it cannot be considered in isolation.  The next two 
maneuvers are much beter known:  racial zoning and the proliferation of 
racially restrictive covenants.203  While both were ultimately held invalid 
by the United States Supreme Court,204 the two practices fared better in 
state courts.  Many court decisions addressing racial zoning and racially 
restrictive covenants both mangled precedent in predictably political 
ways and were dramatically unsympathetic to the ideal of equal 
treatment. 1. Racial Zoning 
White politicians introduced residential segregation zoning 
ordinances beginning in 1910 in response to the influx of higher earning 
Blacks to white neighborhoods.205  The purported purposes of the 
ordinances were to “preserve social peace, protect racial purity, and 
safeguard residential property values.”206  Methods to impose racial 
housing segregation differed:  some cities sought to keep each block 
either all white or all Black by prohibiting anyone of a different race 
from entering, others divided the municipality into distinct racial 
districts, some limited new entrants to a particular block to the race of 
the majority of current residents, and one, New Orleans, required new 
residents of a particular race to obtain the consent of the current residents 
if of a different race.207
These ordinances were very popular and spread quickly.  
Between 1910 and 1916, they were enacted in Baltimore, several cities 
in Virginia, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, Greenville, North Carolina, 
Atlanta, Louisville, St. Louis, Oklahoma City, and New Orleans.208
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Sadly, they were also very popular.  St. Louis’ ordinance, for example, 
was enacted by referendum by a margin of approximately three to one.209
Legal challenges to these ordinances met with mixed success.  
Three states courts to consider the question, Maryland, Georgia, and 
North Carolina, held that the segregation laws were unconstitutional,210
and two others, Virginia and Kentucky, found them constitutional.211
Both the Maryland and the Georgia courts ruled narrowly, however, 
holding the local laws unconstitutional on the grounds that they applied 
retroactively and limited the rights of current property owners to occupy 
their property.  In addition, the Georgia Supreme Court later held that a 
racial zoning law was a reasonable exercise of the police power because 
it would “prevent race friction, disorder, and violence.”212  Only the 
North Carolina Court directly addressed the harm to Blacks from state-
mandated segregation.213
The North Carolina case was brought on appeal from the 
conviction of William Darnell, a Black man, for purchasing a home for 
his family in the “white” territory in Winston-Salem, North Carolina.  
The Court based its decision primarily upon whether the local 
government was empowered by state enabling legislation to enact a 
racial zoning ordinance.  First, the Court mocked the board of alderman 
by stating that to affirm the ordinance would create a precedent allowing 
the board to require:Republicans to live on certain streets and Democrats on others; or 
that Protestants shall reside only in certain parts of the town and 
Catholics in another; or that Germans or people of German 
descent should reside only where they are in the majority, and 
that Irish and those of Irish descent should dwell only in certain 
localities, designated for them by the arbitrary judgment 
and permission of a majority of the aldermen.214
 The Court then likened the ordinance to the residential prohibitions 
upon the Irish and the Jews in Europe, and stated that:  “We can hardly 
believe that the Legislature by the ordinary words in a charter 
authorizing the aldermen to "provide for the public welfare" intended to 
initiate so revolutionary a public policy.”215
While this language suggests respect for the ideal of equal 
treatment, the decision also sends more complex messages.  Among the 
reasons the Court provides for its skepticism that the legislature intended 
to enable local governments to enact racial zoning ordinances is the 
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state’s commitment to retaining Blacks as laborers in the state.  The 
Court concluded that this goal that would not be furthered by racial 
zoning ordinances, explaining that similar ordinances in Ireland and 
Eastern Europe prompted rapid emigration to the United States.  This 
discussion evinces a more material reason for the Court’s vehement 
condemnation of racial zoning.  In addition, the Court was deciding in a 
post-Plessy era and thus the Court noted: “There is no question that 
legislation can control social rights by forbidding intermarriage of the 
races, and in requiring Jim Crow cars, and in similar matters.”216 The 
Court differentiated racial zoning by appealing to the primacy of 
property rights. 
In Buchanan v. Warely, the Kentucky Supreme Court directly 
addressed race as well with a different set of concerns than maintaining a 
laboring class.  The Court began its opinion by describing the problems 
“caused by close association of races under congested conditions found 
in modern municipalities.”217  The Court dismissed the concerns raised 
by the North Carolina Court that upholding a racial zoning ordinance 
would empower a local government to segregate by ethnicity or political 
party as “time-worn sophistries” rejected by the Supreme Court in 
Plessy.218   Rather, the Court evinced concern for the “racial integrity” 
which it found was imperiled by “mere propinquity.”219  The Court 
cloaked its opinion in supposed concern for the interests of Blacks by 
endorsing Booker T. Washington’s notion of racial solidarity and group 
uplift, and contended that the Black community would be better off if 
middle class Blacks were required to stay in Black communities and 
accept “the duties and responsibilities laid upon them by virtue of their 
own success.”220  The Court took more seriously the concern for private 
property rights relied upon by other state courts to invalidate racial 
zoning, but ultimately, the Court accepted progressive era arguments in 
support of government regulation to undercut the primacy of property 
rights.221
Both the Virginia Supreme Court and the Georgie Supreme Court 
adopted the Buchanan reasoning and upheld the racial zoning ordinances 
enacted in Richmond, Ashland, and Atlanta.222  However, these 
decisions were overturned the following year in Buchanan v. Warely
when the Supreme Court of the United States invalidated the Louisville 
216 Id. at 340.
217 Buchanan, 177 S.W. 472.  For a thorough discussion of the Buchanan litigation, 
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ordinance as interfering with property rights in violation of the Due 
Process Clause.223
The latter state court decisions addressing racial zoning were thus 
strinkingly different from the “mere presence” race-nuisance cases.  The 
courts were willing to accept race as a ground to prevent property 
ownership and to distinguish the role of race from ethnicity or party 
membership.  Unlike the Kansas Supreme Court in Falloon, these state 
court decisions do not then follow the tenet of the Civil Rights Act.
Race was central to the outcome of the cases – an ordinance creating 
Democratic and Republican, or Irish and Dutch blocks would have been 
invalid, while an ordinance creating white and Blacks blocks was not.  
The salience of race was also expressly communicated – not cloaked in 
neutral rhetoric.  The courts described the legislatures to be acting in the 
inter ests of both whites and Blacks by keeping them separate, but the 
centrality of race was considered completely legitimate.
2.  Racially Restrictive Covenants
The state courts in the restrictive covenant cases are equally 
willing to allow race to impede property rights – and they mangle 
property doctrine in blatantly result-oriented ways.  This line of cases is 
perhaps even more relevant to thinking about the race-nuisance cases 
because both involve attempts by white homeowners (rather than local 
government) to use legal mechanisms to enforce segregation.  As 
property scholars have long recognized outside the context of race, 
covenants are private attempts to pre-empt disfavored land uses and 
became widespread early in the twentieth century.224  In contrast to the 
race-nuisance cases, which the small number of reported cases suggests 
were fairly rare, racially restrictive covenants became quite common 
during the early 20th century and bear significant responsibility for the 
entrenched housing discriminating that continues to exist.225
Unlike the relatively uniform outcome in the race-nuisance cases, 
there were significant jurisdictional splits in state courts concerning the 
enforceability of racially restrictive covenants.  Most of these cases were 
brought during the same time period as the race-nuisance cases -- the 
early 20th century up until 1948 when the Supreme Court held such 
covenants unenforceable under the Equal Protection Clause.226  During 
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this time, no state court held that the racially estrictive covenants were 
invalid on public policy grounds despite the link between race and rights 
to property.  Only five courts, in California, Michigan, West Virginia, 
Pennsylvania, and Ohio, concluded that racially restrictive covenants 
were invalid restraints on alienation.  And these cases were pyrrhic 
victories.  With the exception of a lower court in Pennsylvania in 
1946,227 even those jurisdictions that found racial restrictions on sales
invalid as restraints upon alienation upheld racial restrictions upon 
occupancy.228
In an illustrative case decided in 1919, the California Supreme 
Court reasoned that a deed restriction on occupancy “is not a restraint
upon alienation, but upon the use of the property.”229 The court 
continued:  “ There is no prohibition of such restraints imosed by way of 
condition nor was there any at common law.”230  In a more searching 
opinion involving an occupancy restriction at the Monroe Avenue 
Church of Christ, the Court of Appeals of Ohio upheld the validity of a 
restriction against occupancy by Negroes and affirmed an injunction to 
evict a Black pastor from the church.231  The court first noted that outside 
of the context of race, use restrictions against liquor, building 
requirements and the like are quite common.  With regard to restrictions 
against occupancy by a class of persons the court stated:  
Comparisons are odious; none are intended.   Only for the 
purpose of developing that which is glaringly obvious, we 
inquire:  Would any one gainsay that one allotting and selling 
property . . . might . . . write into conveyances . . . a restrictive 
covenant against letting a property therein to be occupied and 
used as a house of prostitution?  The absurdity of an affirmative 
answer negates the question.  Yet even prostitutes are a class of 
our citizenry.  If one class may by contract be denied the 
privilege of use and occupancy, why not another?  White may 
exclude black.  Black may exclude white.232
The fallacy of the distinction between alienation and occupancy is quite 
plain.  As Judge McDade of the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas 
argued:  “the distinction between restrictions on alienation and 
restrictions on occupancy certainly appear to be highly artificial and 
illogical, for as a practical matter, if a man not of the white race may not 
occupy land, obviously he cannot for economic reasons buy the 
same.”233
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Contemporaneous commentators noticed and described the 
courts’ deviance from accepted applications of the legal rule prohibiting 
restraints on alienation.  Professor Arthur Martin wrote in 1934 that, 
while there was some jurisdictional divergence in race-neutral covenant 
cases, “there is more than a lack of harmony in the results of the 
application of this Rule to race segregation cases; there is a failure to 
recognize the general purpose which justifies the existence of the 
Rule.”234  In a book entitled, The Legal Status of the Negro, originally 
published in 1940, Professor Charles Magnum writes that:
The state’s attitude toward restraints on alienation in general 
would no doubt influence the court in its consideration of the 
problem, but even this might not be allowed to interfere where 
there was an ingrained prejudice on way or the other.  This is 
illustrated by the fact that the southern states have uniformly 
upheld such covenants whenever the question has been 
presented.235The doctrinal manipulation and utter disavowal of the norm of 
equal treatment in the restrictive covenant cases – and in several of the 
racial zoning cases – undercuts any conclusion that formalism and the 
ideal of equal treatment alone explain the outcomes of the race-nuisance 
cases.  
E. Interest Convergence:  Race Nuisance and Segregation 
Critical race theory offers a possible explanation for the different 
treatment of race nuisance and racial zoning and covenant cases:  interest 
convergence.236 Derrick Bell is best known for this theory and has 
articulated:  "The interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be 
accommodated only when it converges with the interests of whites." 237
If a primary goal of the Jim Crow period was racial segregation,238 then 
perhaps courts were rarely willing to find for individual white plaintiffs 
in the race nuisance cases because very few of the race-nuisance cases 
challenged the architecture of segregation.  Rather, most of the cases 
involved white challenges to the location of all-Black institutions.239
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Another set of cases involved wealthy white families seeking to house 
their Black servants on their property.240  Only a small subset of the 
cases involved the potential integration of racial minorities as equals into 
white neighborhoods.241
For a racially segregated society to exist, Black institutions had to 
be located somewhere, and the small Black enclaves may not have been 
big enough for cemeteries, hospitals, parks and sanatoriums.  Therefore, 
the decisions to reject claims that all-Black institutions constituted a 
nuisance may have been consistent with the general societal goal of 
segregation.  This conclusion has some support in other reported cases in 
which individual or small groups of white landowners tried to challenge 
zoning decisions or the use of municipal funds for Black cemeteries, 
parks and schools.  In each, courts rejected the claims of the individual 
white landowners in favor of the broader societal interest of a segregated 
society.242
Several of the cases did seem contrary to the goal of segregation, 
however.  Falloon, Lancaster, and Woods v. Kiersky all involved suits 
seeking to prevent Blacks from living in white neighborhoods.  These 
can perhaps be explained by altering slightly the articulation of the white 
interests at stake.  Perhaps segregation per se was not the primary goal of 
Jim Crow, but rather, racial subordination or white dominance.  Though 
the presence of Black servants obviously offended the particular 
neighbors in Lancaster and Woods v. Kiersky, this sort of racial 
proximity did not challenge the societal goal of racial subordination or 
some descriptons of the general interests of the dominant class.  
Generally, even those hostile to living near blacks made exceptions for 
Black servants since “it had always been a central tenet of white racist 
ideology that . . . whenever the two races come into contact, the white 
man must rule, and the black man must serve.”243   According to a white 
Missippian and former slaveowner, whites had no objection to personal 
association with Blacks, “provided it be upon terms which contain no 
suggestion of equality of personal status.”244
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Allowing for a broad definition of white interest, the vast 
major ity of the race-nuisance cases did not actually challenge the 
dominant racial mores of the times.  Rather, all but five cases were either 
consistent with the goal of establishing a segregated society or with 
maintaining the role of African Americans as a servant class.  Only 
Qualls II, Falloon, Hollbrook, Worm v. Wood, and Redmond involved 
the potential for the integeration of racial minorities as relative equals.  
Indeed, one can argue that even Falloon and Worm did not truly 
challenge racial supremecy.  In both cases, Blacks and other racial 
minorities were to be housed in small shacks in what seem to be more 
prosperous white neighborhoods.  Arguably then, these cases involved 
proximity but not equality since the shacks did not connote that the 
residents were the equals of the neighboring whites.  
This theory has some traction:  unlike the racial zoning and 
restrictive covenant cases, race nuisance cases did not further segregation 
in any coherent way and therefore, courts were able to give lip-service to 
applying doctrine fairly and adhering to egalitarian norms. While courts 
perceiving value in the appearance of even-handedness is still perhaps 
surprising to those who previously adhered to the “pawn” view of state 
courts, it does not undercut the interest convergence take.  This argument 
is similar to Berry’s analysis of the inheritance cases.  She contends that:
Judges let African American mistresses and their children inherit 
according to the provisions of a white patriarch’s will because 
their claims reinforced rather than threatened male domination 
and race relations.245
The primary limitation of the interest convergence take, in my 
view, is that it is most helpful as an ex post explanation for the outcomes 
of cases rather than for predicting how courts will rule ex ante.  In both 
the race-nuisance cases and the inheritance cases, either conclusion the 
courts reached can be explained as supporting racist norms.  
In addition, as noted above, a few of the race-nuisance cases 
would seem contrary to dominant white interests.   Mr. Qualls, described 
as a highly successful funeral home director, brought two separate 
actions to overturn zoning decisions by the City of Memphsis seeking 
entry into what the courts describe as an affluent part of town.246  Mr. 
Qualls and his lawyers expressly challenged the zoning decisions as 
racist actions, seeking to have the decisions overturned as violations of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  The fact that Mr. Qualls succeeded in his 
second action, and that the Supreme Court of Tennessee ruled that he 
should be allowed to operate his casket business and live in an affluent 
white part of Memphsis would be difficult to predict using an interest 
convergence analysis. 
245 BERRY, supra note __, at 81. 
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Redmond is perhaps even more quixotic.  The suit was brought in 
Mississippi in 1928 and involved a Black man administering drugs and 
medicine to both Blacks and whites, including white women.  The case 
raised all the specters of white paranoia – and it would seem in the 
inter ests of white doctors to preclude Blacks from administering 
medicine without a license.  Yet the Court refused to issue an injunction 
prohibiting him from operating.  
In addition, interest convergence seems to assume that white 
interests are monolithic and that racialized interests supercede all other 
interests or principles.  These assumptions are disproved even in the 
small world of cases this essay considers.  The preferences of whites 
often diverged from racist norms:  in Worm v. Wood, it was in the 
landowner’s interest to be able to have wide access to potential tenants of 
whatever race; the white patients of Mr. Redmond preferred his medical 
treatment to other available white doctors.  Similarly, the white real 
estate broker plaintiff in Buchanan v. Warely like the defendant in Worm 
v. Wood inveighed against a racially restricted client base, and indeed the 
white owners of the railroad that colluded in Plessy v. Ferguson had 
financial reasons to prefer an end to segregated rail cars.  While the 
majority of white voters sadly were supportive of racial zoning – many 
white financial interests were harmed by these same mechanisms.  
1. Protecting the Rights of White Property Owners
Perhaps then the interest convergence theory need only be 
amended to add the primacy of property rights.  Many commentators 
have contended that the importance of property rights has historically 
transcended even support for segregation.247  This principle seems  to 
explain the Supreme Court’s decision invalidating the racial zoning 
ordinance in Buchanan v. Warely.  Even the Supreme Court’s “notorious 
racist,”248 Justice James McReynolds, joined the opinion.  The primacy 
of property rights was evident in the first set of southern courts cases 
invalidating racial zoning ordinances.249  The North Carolina Supreme 
Court, for example, appeared moved not as much by constitutional 
concerns, as the “inalienable right to own, acquire, and dispose of 
property, which is not conferred by the Constitution, but exists of natural 
right.”250Justice Brewer, for example, whom I noted above may have 
harbored integrationist views, is better known as a strong proponent of 
property rights.251  In a speech at Yale Law School, he described the 
“sacredness” of property ownership and the “love of acquirement, 
247 KLARMAN, JIM CROW, supra note __, at 79-81.
248 Id. at 81.
249 Id.
250 Id. (quoting State v. Darnell, 81 S.E. at 340); Schmitt, supra note __, at 501-502.
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mingled with the joy of possession.”252 The “natural-law/natural-rights” 
theory of property that Brewer and others of his time likely adhered to 
extolled the notion of man’s “equal freedom of action” over his land.253
This theory provides a powerful protection for individual’s rights to use 
their property – unless that use results in a physical invasion of another’s 
property.254
This natural right theory of property which included the rights to 
use and transfer as widely as possible may even have trumped the racism 
of the period.  According to a contemporaneous scholar, the main 
concern animating courts during this period was protecting the ability of 
white property owners to sell their property:
Courts have in many instances diverged from their usual policy 
of upholding the separatists.  In abandoning their customary 
attitude toward policies of like nature, the courts have probably 
been influenced by the fact that white property owners would 
otherwise be limited in their ability to transfer their property.255
This view also correlates with the outcomes in the race-nuisance 
cases.  Seven of the eight “mere presence” cases involved disputes 
between white landowners.256  Ten of the cases clearly involved white 
property owners on both sides of the dispute.257  In another elevent of the 
cases, it is not clear whether the property owner of the challenged land 
use was white or Black.258  In only seven of the cases was the property 
owner or owners of the challenged use definitely Black.259 Though it 
must be noted that of the six cases in which the property owner was 
Black, in all but one, the Black property owner prevailed.
The principle of protecting property owners from external 
intrusion helps distinguish between the race-nuisance and restrictive 
252 Id. at 435 (quoting David J. Brewer, Protection to Private Property from Public 
Attack, Address Before the Graduating Classes at Yale Law School (June 23, 1891)).
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covenant cases.  The latter involve a property owner’s desire to impose 
restrictions upon his own property into the future while the former 
involves interference by purely external forces.260 As Eric Claeyes has 
recently detailed, nineteenth century property theorists were loath to 
allow law to dictate how an individual used his land:   “many are the 
degrees, many are the varieties of human genius, human dispositions, 
and human characters.  One man has a turn for mechanicks; another for 
architecture; one paints; a second makes poems; this excels in the arts of 
a military; the other, in those of civil life.  To account for these varieties 
of taste and character is not easy, is, perhaps impossible.”261
Accordingly, for judges to determine that Blacks constituted a per se 
nuisance was a significant deviation from the court’s general protection 
of individual property owners’ preferences.  By contrast, the restrictive 
covenant cases involved property owner’s attempts to control their own 
property through contract law.
Many scholars have suggested that the line of cases during the 
Jim Crow and Progressive eras that protected property rights even when 
such protections mitigated against racial segregation were somehow less 
important to the pursuit of equal justice for people of color.262 Protecting 
property rights alone is obviously not sufficient when it is not 
accompanied by access to education, employment, capital, and even-
handed application of criminal laws.  However, race neutral protection of 
property rights was a critical step in the movement toward civil rights in 
this country.  If the protection of private property is a central function of 
government in a capitalist society, the failure to protect the property of 
one class of citizens would have been significant indeed.263 More 
specifically, court decisions invalidating the property rights of Black 
people on grounds that their presence was offensive could well have led 
to a juridical apartheid.  As other commentators have argued, the 
protection of property rights illustrated Jim Crow’s legal limits.264 The 
race nuisance cases, then, along with the Supreme Court’s decisions 
invalidating racial zoning and finally holding racially restrictive 
260   Property theorists discussion of the preference for forward looking covenants to 
ad hoc nuisance. 
261   Claeyes, supra note __, at 7 (quoting James Wilson at 240-41).
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covenants unenforceable were of enormous importance in the the 20th
century’s civil rights struggle.265
IV. RACE NUISANCE AND RACIAL LIBERATION -- INSIGHTS INTO 
THE PRESENT 
One response to the race nuisance cases is:  So what?  If in most 
areas of law, state courts in the Jim Crow era did ignore the legal rights 
of Black people, why does this small set of cases matter in the big 
picture?  I contend that these cases – and likely a host of others -- matter 
for multiple reasons, both intellectual and practical.
First, mischaracterizing the state courts’ jurisprudential practices 
leads scholars to misinterpret the Supreme Court’s practices.  Scholars 
such as David Bernstein and Sonia Somin have described the Supreme 
Court’s race decisions, and particularly Buchanan, during the 
Progressive era as remarkable.  They emphasize the significance of a 
decision invalidating racial zoning during the most racist period in post-
Civil War American history, and the facts that (1) the Court had to 
distinguish Plessy and “was not entirely persuasive in doing so:”; (2) 
during this period, sociological jurisprudence were in the ascendance; 
and (3) the Supreme Court had recently upheld nonracial zoning, on 
grounds that could as easily been applied to racial zoning.  However, 
Buchanan is not nearly so remarkable if viewed in light of the race 
nuisance cases.  The Supreme Court should not be given credit for 
progressive racial views if state courts during the same era were adhering 
to similar ideals.  Our intellectual history of the Supreme Court will 
necessarily be incomplete and misinformed if we ignore the backdrop of 
state court decisions against which the Court acted.
Conversely, the cases are also provide insight into the limits of 
race neutrality.  The last race-nuisance case, Wright v. DeFatta, was 
decided in 1962.  In that case, white plaintiffs were successful in seeking 
an injunction prohibiting the construction of “an excessive number of 
Negro dwellings contrary to the Municipal Comprehensive Zoning 
Ordinance.”266 The date of that case is perhaps not surprising – by the 
1960s, racism was at the beginning of its retreat to the shadows of human 
behavior.  However, as we know, the legal mandate against explicit 
racism did not result in its demise.  
Racial zoning may have been invalidated during the Progressive 
era, but as many have detailed, myriad race-neutral laws have 
265 Id. Bernstein & Somin quote W.E.B. Du Bois as crediting Buchanan with "the 
breaking of the backbone of segregation." Id. at 633-34. The late Judge Leon 
Higginbotham argued that "Buchanan was of profound importance in applying a brake 
to decelerate what would have been run-away racism in the United States." (quoted in 
Bernstein & Somin, supra note __, n254).
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nonetheless been applied to create a segregated and unequal society.267
Indeed, without expressly referencing “race,” some have argued, 
governments used zoning intentionally to permit the intrusion of 
incompatible uses into Black neighborhoods and destroy the quality of 
life.268  These schemes zoned low income residential areas occupied 
primarily by Blacks for industrial or commercial use.269  Because other 
areas of a municipality prohibit such uses, industrial developers would 
locate in the Black neighborhoods – bringing with them the noise, odors, 
and pollution that zoning was ostensibly intended to eliminate.  Yale 
Rabin named this practice “expulsive zoning” because it had the effect of 
expelling Black residents from their homes.270  However, he contends 
that many Blacks were unable to leave these neighborhoods even after 
industry intruded because of housing discrimination elsewhere.271  The 
combination of expulsive zoning and housing discrimination led Black 
comunities in urban areas to become blighted and overcrowded.272
Many local governments also used their zoning power to prevent the 
poor from moving to newly established suburbs or to middle and upper 
income neighborhoods which had the effect of segregating the poor –
and often people of color -- within cities.273  Arguably, then, zoning has 
had dire effects upon people of color without violating the legal formalist 
impediment of race neutrality.  
White plaintiffs’ lack of success in classifying Black people as 
nuisances per se has not rendered nuisance law wholly free from racial 
effects either.  Beginning in the Jim Crow era and continuing into the 
late 20th century, local officials have used their authority to eliminate 
public nuisances to enact various race neutral vagrancy, anti-loitering, 
and most recently, anti-gang statutes that have had a vastly 
disproportionate impact upon people of color.274 As Dorothy Roberts 
267 See, e.g., Godsil, supra note __.
268 YALE RABIN, EXPULSIVE ZONING: THE INEQUITABLE LEGACY OF EUCLID, IN 
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and other scholars have argued, these ostensibly race neutral statutes 
were often by design or effect focused upon criminalizing and excluding 
African Americans from public spaces.275  When the exclusionary 
intention or effect has been too obvious, the Supreme Court has often 
intervened even if on grounds other than the Equal Protection Clause.  
For example, in the 1970s, in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, the 
Supreme Court invalidated as vague an anti-loitering law, holding:
Those generally implicated by the imprecise terms of the ordinance -
poor people, nonconformists, dissenters, idlers - may be required to 
comport themselves according to the lifestyle deemed appropriate by 
the Jacksonville police and the courts. Where, as here, there are no 
standards governing the exercise of the discretion granted by the 
ordinance, the scheme ... furnishes a convenient tool for "harsh and 
discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials, against 
particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure."276
And more recently, in City of Chicago v. Morales, the Supreme 
Court invalidated a loitering ordinance enacted in Chicago which 
allowed police officers to order any group of two or more people to 
disperse if one is a suspected gang member and to arrest and imprison 
anyone who refused.277  The anti-loitering ordinance was race neutral, 
and race was not a basis for the Court’s decision.  However, as Roberts 
reported:  “[d]uring the three years the law was in effect, it yielded 
arrests of more than 40,000 citizens, most of whom were Black or Latino 
residents of inner-city neighborhoods.”278 Most interesting, perhaps, is 
the debate as to whether people of color were ultimately helped or 
harmed by the Supreme Court’s decision.279
In most facets of our society -- education, incarcertain rates, 
earnings, capitol, life expectancy, infant mortality, access to health care, 
quality of environment – race remains a salient fact.  In some of these, 
law itself remains a barrier to equality.  In this Article, I have suggested 
that the race neutrality ideal present in the race nuisance cases was a 
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critical turn away from legalized apartheid, but I also recognize that it 
has never been sufficient to overcome the use of law to achieve 
racialized ends by some segments of society.   
Apart from intellectual history, the cases’ practical significance 
were primarily a negative:  contary decisions in these cases -- Black 
people as a matter of law are a nuisance – would have signaled a turn 
toward a dramatically worse society.  However, the cases yield several 
more nuanced insights that are useful in thinking through the current 
pursuit of racial liberation and equal justice.
The first insight is that those seeking to protect the interests of 
disempowered group should be willing to seek such protection in long-
held common law precedents rather than focusing exclusively upon 
contested provisions of the Constitution or the civil rights regulatory 
framework.280  Long before the Supreme Court overturned Plessy v. 
Ferguson, southern state courts were at least in some instances 
recognizing the norm of race neutrality in applying common law legal 
doctrines.  The reflexive formalism found in the race nuisance cases is 
likely similarly to be triggered by strategies linked to property and 
contract law.281 Judges may well be more protective of common law 
legal doctrines because they presume they will apply as well to white 
litigants.  A variant of this argument has been waged by scholars seeking 
to understand Buchanan.  The insight that those seeking racial justice should utilize 
doctrines that apply more generally leads to the second insight:  the cases 
remind us of the utility of interest convergence or as I’d prefer to call it 
“strategic alliances.”282 I must begin by acknowledging that Derrick 
Bell himself is deeply skeptical that interest convergence will lead to any 
true eradication of racism.283  Bell has stated:  “Beyond the ebb and flow 
of racial progress lies the still viable and widely accepted (though 
seldom expressed) belief that America is a white country in which 
blacks, particularly as a group, are not entitled to the concern, resources, 
or even empathy that would be extended to similarly situated whites.”284
Others have more hope.  Sherryl Cashin in a recent piece reflects 
upon the role of “coalition politics” in the civil rights revolution, and 
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seeks to harness interest convergence “to build the sustainable 
multiracial coalitions that will be necessary if we are to close existing 
gaps of racial inequality.”285 Indeed, Cashin quotes Bell for the 
proposition that alliances can be beneficial:  
Despite its limited benefit, those who defended the University of 
Michigan affirmative action plans utilized diversity as a self-interest 
strategy planned for in advance rather than a happy coincidence 
recognized in retrospect. n80
This tradition has a long vintage, of course.  As noted above, Plessy
itself, while unsuccessful, was based upon the joint interest of African 
Americans and the railroads who found the segregation laws expensive 
and inexedient.286 Buchanan also involved a strategic alliance between 
African Americans in Baltimore and a white real estate magnate who 
sought the freedom to sell to people of whatever race.287
I would also argue that organizing across race is not and should 
not always be based upon the perceived convergence of economic 
inter ests of people of color and the dominant class of whites.  White 
interests, like the interests of people of color, are not monolithic.  Class, 
gender, occupation, geography, political belief system – all are bases 
upon which particular groups of people may have more in common with 
particular groups of people of other races and ethnicities  than with 
others of their own race. 288
While a full exploration of this theme is beyond the scope of this 
article, and some will undoubtedly criticize my naivite, it has been my 
own experience in engaging in multi-racial coalitions in the 
environmental justice context that strategic alliances or interest 
convergence remind us that we share common humanity.
VI.  CONCLUSION
The race nuisance cases are fascinating pieces of history.  What 
remains unanswered from the appellate opinions alone, however, is 
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whether the unsuccessful white plaintiffs honored the decisions denying 
them relief or whether they pursued extra-legal means.  Was Mr. 
Redmond run out of town after the decision was rendered?  Did John 
Falloon respond violently to the preacher and his family?  Were the 
houses ever constructed for the prospective Black, Mexican, and poor 
white tenants from Texas?  How did the tenacious Mr. Qualls fare?  As 
always, the opinions were only the penultimate step, the real story lies in 
the implementation. 
